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Regional Security Studies Center

Research Memorandum
RSSC-RM 4923-30

COUNTERINSURGENCY ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS: SOUTH THAILAND (U)

by
ROBERT E. MORSE

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Prepared for:

U.S. ARMY MISSILE COMMAND
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
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
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ABSTRACT

This report contains information pertaining to insurgency and counterinsurgency in the five most southern provinces of Thailand. The insurgent activity is considered in relation to both actual and potential sources of conflict. The counterinsurgency effort--direct security measures, and both short- and long-term development projects--is also discussed.

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I (U) SUMMARY (U)

A. (U) Purpose (U)

(U) This report was prepared by the Stanford Research Institute under contract with the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD/ARPA), specifically under Project AGILE, ARPA's Overseas Defense Research Program. It was sponsored locally by the joint Thai-U.S. Military Research and Development Center (MRDC), located in Bangkok, Thailand.

(U) The purpose of the work reported here was to compile a description of the counterinsurgency (CI) organizations, programs, and activities in the border provinces of southern Thailand and in the five provinces on or immediately to the north of the Thai-Malaysian border and south of the Kra Isthmus. To that end, it serves as a supplement to the seven-volume Counterinsurgency Organizations and Programs in Northeast Thailand, a comprehensive treatment of the same subject matter in the Northeast, which is being compiled by the Research Analysis Corporation Field Office-Thailand (RACFO-T) for ARPA. Since many of the same counterinsurgency organizations and programs are found in both regions, the approach taken in this report has been to rely on the RACFO-T volumes to present basic or generalized mission, organizations, and operations information, and to confine this report to organizations and programs that are not found in the Northeast. When organizations and programs common to both regions are treated, the information presented in this report relates specifically to the situation in the South. Accordingly, this is not a comprehensive, self-contained volume--nor should it be, given the relatively minor effort allocated to it--but must be approached in the context of the compendium for the Northeast.

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(U) As in the case of the Northeast series of reports, the information in this volume is intended to be of value to those who are involved in Thailand's counterinsurgency effort, as practitioners, advisors, or researchers. The proliferation of agencies and organizations performing similar or closely related CI functions, often overlapping, or seemingly so, has created a need for systematic compilation and description of such activities in a readily accessible format. This report hopefully satisfies that need in some small way, at least with regard to the South.

B. (U) Background (U)

(U) The principal source of conflict in southern Thailand is the Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO), the militant arm of the Malayan Communist Party and formerly the Malayan National Liberation Army during the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960). This insurgent force entered Thai territory in the late 1950s with a strength of about 400, but at least half of the original members have since died or left the organization for reasons of health. The CTO has reorganized and recruited Thai nationals into their ranks; the present strength of armed and uniformed personnel is variously estimated at 700 to 1000, with a reserve force of over 2500 that could be called to active duty.

(U) In many ways the most politically sensitive problem and potential source of conflict facing the Thai government in the South, and one that still absorbs a great deal of its attention, is that of the so-called Separatists. Their goals and methods are essentially political, aimed at either replacing the Thai-Buddhist officials with Thai-Islam officials and, thereby, reducing the scope of governmental authority in the region or detaching the border provinces from Thailand.

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(U) Finally, contributing also to the incidence of armed violence in the South, is the presence of organized banditry which, while hardly uncommon in other areas of the country, has flourished under the conditions in the South.

(U) In response to these actual and potential sources of conflicts, the RTG counterinsurgency effort has taken the form of direct security measures supplemented by long term rural development programs. The development programs related to counterinsurgency operations are centered in the civil community development programs and the military-sponsored Mobile Development Units (MDU) and Special Operations Centers (SOC). The direct counterinsurgency effort is under the jurisdiction of the Border Patrol Police (BPP) and, in the case of joint Thai/Malaysian operations, the Regional Border Committee Office (RBCO).

C. (U) Approach (U)

(U) This report is, in large part, based on past Stanford Research Institute work in southern Thailand performed as part of its effort, under ARPA contract since 1964, to develop counterinsurgency surveillance techniques. These SRI studies, carried out with the cooperation of the Royal Thai Government, which permitted access to Thai agencies and organizations in south Thailand, as well as the combined Thai-Malaysian Regional Border Committee Office in Songkhla, have resulted in a number of special studies dealing with various aspects of both the insurgency and counterinsurgency environment. In addition, this report draws on the author's interviews, access to records and reports, and personal observation during nearly a three-year period spent in the south of Thailand.

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(U) Specifically, the following data sources were utilized in the compilation of the data presented in this report:

Regional Border Committee Office, Songkhla
Headquarters, 9th Area BPP, Songkhla
Headquarters, 1st Company, 9th Area BPP, Sadao
Headquarters, 2nd Company, 9th Area BPP, Mathawi
Headquarters, 3rd Company, 9th Area BPP, Betong
Headquarters, 9th Region Provincial Police, Songkhla
Office of the Governor, Songkhla Province
Office of the Governor, Pattani Province
Office of the Governor, Satul Province
Office of the Governor, Narathiwat Province
Office of the Governor, Yala Province
Headquarters, SOC 51, Camp Col.
Ingkayudhboriharn, Pattani Province
Headquarters, MDU-4, Narathiwat Province
Headquarters, MDU-5, Yala Province
Headquarters, MDU-12, Pattani Province
Headquarters, MDU-13, Satul Province
Representatives of U.S. Operations Mission and U.S. Information Service

(U) Since this report is intended to be a descriptive account of the existing counterinsurgency systems and programs in the area, with such documentation as is available, the data are presented in a narrative, mission-oriented format.

(U) No conclusions or recommendations are drawn; the intent, in accordance with an RDC-T approved plan, is to provide detailed, descriptive exposition with documentation.

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II (c) THE CONFLICT SETTING (U)

(U) This section will consider three areas of real or potential conflict that may have serious political or economic consequences (or both) for the people of South Thailand. The most serious of the three-- in the nature of the threat, the degree of organization, and the numbers of members participating--is the CTO that operates in three (Songkhla, Yala, and Narathiwat) of the five southern provinces.

(U) The second, but at this time apparently only potential, area of conflict is that of Separatist activity in the four Moslem provinces of the South, where the Thai-Islam constitute a majority of the population. The area has a history of irredentist movements and organizations, which now appear to lack real vitality due to organizational fragmentation, lack of leadership, and improving Royal Thai Government efforts at assimilation of the Thai-Moslems. But the Separatist problem will for some time probably remain potentially explosive and vulnerable to exploitation.

(U) Finally, there is the problem of banditry--organized groups that prey on the villagers, extorting money, food, and other supplies. Bandit gangs are not uncommon in other areas of Thailand, but in the South, and in particular the province of Pattani, conditions are such that banditry flourishes. Indeed, the armed violence of bandit groups probably poses the greatest immediate security problem to the Thai authorities in the South.

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(U)
(C) A. The Communist Terrorist Organization* (U)

1. (U) ~~(C)~~ Origin (U)

(U) ~~(C)~~ The CTO that exists in south Thailand is not a native Communist movement, but rather was built up by the remnants of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) that was driven out of Malaysia in the late 1950s. There is some indication that the CTO in the four southern provinces has some relationship with the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT).

(U) ~~(C)~~ The first records of Communist activity date back to 1922 in Singapore and the Johore Districts of Malaya. Communist agitators were organizing cells and preparing for the formation of a party organization. In late 1930 or early 1931, the Communist Party of Malaya was established. From 1932 through 1937, the Communists organized the workers into labor unions, in an attempt to gain control of the working force. With this control, the Communists hoped to drive the British out by organizing worker strikes that would cause British business interests to lose money. Somewhat naively, the Communists believed that if the British business interests lost money, they would leave Malaya without a fight. The CPM was not very successful in organizing the unions; consequently their premise was never tested. With the beginning of hostilities in China, the CPM adopted a new line. From 1939 to 1940, they preached an anti-Japanese propaganda line to the large number of Chinese in Malaya. However, they still used the anti-British line when dealing with native Malays.

(U) ~~(C)~~ In 1941, the CPM formed the Malaya Party Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). This became the active guerrilla army of the CPM in their fight against the Japanese Army occupying Malaysia. It was also to be the forerunner of the CTO. The MPAJA was armed and supplied by the British. In 1945 the MPAJA was demobilized; however, the leaders claimed that most of the arms and other supplies had been lost or used.

* See D. Price, "The Communist Terrorist Organization (U)," OAD-EM 4923-5, SRI, January 1967.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ From 1946 to 1948, the CPM was a legal political party. However, a conflict of policy arose at the very top level of the party structure. Loi Tek, then the Secretary General, and his Deputy, Chen Ping, could not agree on the methods to follow in taking over control of the country. Loi Tek contended that the best method was to gain control through political and peaceful means. Chen Ping, on the other hand, claimed that control could be obtained only through an armed revolution. The problem was settled when Chen Ping announced that Loi Tek had absconded with the party funds and that he, Chen Ping was the new Secretary General of the party. Loi Tek was never heard from again.

(U) ~~(S)~~ On assumption of command, Chen Ping immediately opened hostilities against the government. The period of the hostilities from 1948 to 1960 became known as the Malayan Emergency.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The Malayan Emergency was hardly a year old when Chen Ping sent representatives of the CPM to meet with representatives of the Thai Communist Party. This meeting was held in 1949 in Thailand, and the two parties agreed that the CPM should be given the responsibility to develop and control the area as far north as Haadyai or along the seventh parallel. The initial steps were then instituted to ensure the dominance of the CPM in the south of Thailand.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The following data have been included as documentary evidence of the working agreement established by the CPM and the Thai Communist Party (TCP). Though there has been little direct evidence of cooperation between the two organizations, the following translation of a paper prepared by a former CIO member (now working for the Malaysian Police, Special Branch) and the cited passages from intelligence reports indicate that some relationship does exist:*

* (U) The translation and the intelligence reports are from the files of the Regional Border Committee Office, Songkha, Thailand.

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(U) TRANSLATION (U)

(U) (S) HOW THE LINK BETWEEN THE MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY (MCP) AND THE THAI COMMUNIST PARTY WAS ESTABLISHED

(U) (S) In the early part of 1949, because of the incessant attack conducted by the British Army/Police (It was considered quite a major operation at that time), the 67 platoon of the 8th Regiment CTO was beaten into small sections scattering about. One of these small sections led by SIU PANG ran over to BETONG District area and took shelter. From then onward, this section of the 8th Regiment was operated in the BETONG District area independently.

(U) (S) In late 1949, the Commanding Officers of the 12th Regiment, LAM YEUNG, LO MA and WAI POH received reports as follows: A group of the 8th Regiment personnel had absconded to BETONG District area and had lost contact with the Organization. The 8th Regiment Commanding Officer had sent three men (one of them was SEP SIEW HONG who surrendered in PEPAK) to BETONG area to look for them and to re-establish contact. With the assistance of the masses, contact was resumed very quickly.

(U) (S) Prior to the arrival of the MCP personnel in BETONG area, the TCP was already operating in the area secretly in the form of a semi-open masses organization known as the "Mutual Aid Society." They carried out activities in the name of promoting mutual aid and philanthropic works.

(U) (S) It was reported that this TCP controlled "Mutual Aid Society" was formed in 1948. The Chief promoter was CHUNG Peng-Nam who first got hold of CHUNG Tat-Meng, CHEUNG MENG, LO Peng-Yuen, LO Ah-Man, SOO Pak-Him, and CHAN YOKE @ (alias) FAH Up-Chai etc. as his copromoters. Under their promotion, the Mutual Aid Society was successfully formed in BETONG area. Though no application for approval from the Government was made, yet it could be said that it was a semi-open organization known to everybody.

(U) (S) As soon as the MCP personnel arrived in BETONG area, the first thing they did was to eliminate the local criminal bandits who were there terrorising the masses. This they did to gain the confidence of the masses and at the same time to win over their support. Then through the relationship of the

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(C)

masses, they sought established relationship with the TCP, because they knew that the Mutual Aid Society was a pro-Communist semi-open leftist organization. (The mutual aid society has distributed some pro-Communist documents like "The Manifesto of the Asian/Australian Industrial Campaign" written by LIU Shao-Chi and "30 Years of Revolution in China" etc). Therefore they tried to exploit this Mutual Aid Society. At the beginning, the MCP personnel had a talk with the responsible person of the Mutual Aid Society, CHUNG Peng-Nam. Later, CHUNG Peng-Nam brought them to YALA to see one higher ranking TCP personnel named KAM SAU and a further talk was conducted. (It was reported that the MCP representative was known as AH LOO and that KAM SAU has been arrested by the Thai Government sometime in 1954 and later deported out of the country.) It was during this talk that the following resolutions were made:

1. To draw up an operational area for the MCP. All the areas south of YALA (i.e., all the areas near the Malayan/Thai border) to be the responsibility of the MCP for communist activities. (This area was enlarged to include all south of 7°.)
2. To cease all the TCP activities in areas South of YALA and to dissolve the TCP controlled Masses Organization like the Mutual Aid Society in BETONG. All enthusiastic and pro-Communist elements to be introduced to the MCP for exploitation.
3. All MCP activities and propaganda conducted in the above mentioned area must pay respect and safeguard the reputation of the TCP.

(u) Hence, the link between the TCP and the MCP was established after the above-mentioned talk was conducted and resolutions were made. At the same time, according to general reports received, the reasons for the dissolution of the Mutual Aid Society suggested by the TCP were as follows:

1. This masses organization has been widely penetrated by Thai Government officials.

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2. To draw up boundry of operation so as to avoid any misunderstanding/conflict that might occur in the course of carrying out each other's activities.

Dick (Former CTO Member)
11 January 1967

(U) (S)

From a report dated November 22, 1967, the following is cited:

(C) 2.b.(c)(4).* There is a report of a known active member of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) from Kuan Kanoon District, Patalung Province, to have joined the CPM in San Yaron Area (QY9716). He is believed to be a contact man between the CTO in the Betong Salient and the CPT in Patalung.

(U) (S)

From a report dated November 15, 1967, the following is cited:

(C) 2.a.(A)(2). On 13 September 1967, at about 1900 hours, three identified pro-Communist elements at Wong Kian-Min's Chaffee Shop in Bangla Village (QT1528), Sadao District, were heard criticizing a high ranking government official-- touched on aid from Red China in the event of an uprising-- and that a link existed between the CPT and CPM.

(U) (S)

By 1953, the CPM was finding it difficult to survive in Malaya, and Chen Ping moved his headquarters into the Betong area of Thailand. During the next five years the CPM suffered defeat after defeat, and in 1958 Chen Ping ordered the remnants of his forces into Thailand. Estimates of Chen Pings forces at this time vary considerably, but approximately 400 would seem to be a fair estimate.

(U) (S)

Since 1958, there has been a steady growth of the CPM/CTO in south Thailand and an extension of the power and influence of the two groups. The CTO has spent 10 years establishing its presence and indoctrinating the masses. The original members of the CTO, who came

* These references indicate the report cited.

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from Malaya, are being slowly replaced by locally recruited Thai nationals. Although the CTO still publicly announces its intention to return to Malaysia, it has gradually adopted a position against the Thai government.

2. (U) (S) CTO Areas of Operation in the Thai/Malaysian Border Area (C)

(U) (S) There are three accepted areas of CTO operation in the Thai/Malaysian Border area (see map, Figure 1). In addition, there is also the CPM High Command (Secretary General's Group) within the operational orbit of the CTO in south Thailand. To date there is no intelligence data available with respect to the CPM High Command and it is not possible even to suggest the probable location of this important directing group.

a. (U) (S) Kedah/Penang Joint State Committee (KPJSC) - 8th Regiment Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) (C)

(U) (S) This State Committee operates in the western sector of Songkhla Province. The active CT groups are:

- Sadao/Setul District Committee
- Ban Prik/Khlaung Ngae District Committee
- Na Plang/Kau Mai Yai District Committee

The main centers of CT activity are:

- Pakan Siam
- North of Padang Besar
- Sadao
- Sadao Triangle
- Ban Prik
- Khlaung Ngae
- Na Plang

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


FIGURE 1 CTO AREAS OF ACTIVITY IN SOUTHERN THAILAND (C)

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(U)
b. (S) Central Department of Malay Works (CDMW) - 10th Regiment MNLA (C)

(U) (S) The CDMW operates in the eastern sector of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat Provinces. The active CT groups are:

- Bannang Sata District Committee
- Weng/Dusun Nyior District Committee

The main centers of CT activity are:

- Bannang Sata
- Ballang
- Charak Batong
- Saga/Weng

(U)
c. (S) Kelantan/Perak Border Committee (KPBC) - 12th Regiment MNLA (C)

(U) (S) The KPBC operates in the central sector of Yala Province and parts of Upper Perak and Kelantan (Malaysian States). The active CT groups are:

- Special District Committee operating in the Betong Salient
- Fourth District Committee operating in the Yala area
- Independent District Committee operating in the Ban To area.

The main centers of CT activity are:

- Betong Town
- Kapaek
- Upper/Lower Rambong
- Yaron
- Chantarat
- Ayer Panas

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- Ban Yee Rai
- Kilos 4 to 18
- Betong Yala Road
- Yaha area

d. (U) Ethnic Composition (U)

(U) Of the three main areas of CTO operation, the populations of two of the areas are primarily ethnic Chinese; that of the third area is approximately 90 percent Thai-Islam. Inasmuch as most CTO members are ethnic Chinese and the language of the CTO is Chinese Mandarin, the organization can appeal to the ethnic sensibilities of the local population. For example, Betong, in the southern part of Yala Province, is approximately 80 percent Chinese and has one of the heaviest concentrations of CTO members and is a center of CTO activity.

(U) On the other hand, the CTO uses its Thai-Islam members in areas of heavy concentrations of Thai-Islam such as Waeng, Narathivas. The CTO exploits the goals of the dissident Separatists groups within the Thai-Islam communities and proposes that if the CTO is successful in its mission to return to power in Malaysia, the success of the Separatists will follow, with the aid and cooperation of the CTO.

(U)
3. ~~(C)~~ CTO Policy (U)

(U) ~~(C)~~ The present policy of the CTO appears on the surface to have remained unchanged since the Malaya Emergency period, when its propaganda was directed against the British and Malay Government officials. The CTO has maintained that its policy toward Thailand is one of complete neutrality and noninterference. However, the actual policy does not follow the professed policy. Rather, the CTO is interfering with the

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functions of the Royal Thai Government, and its propaganda is both anti-British/Malaysian and anti-Thai government.

(U)
4. (S) Operational Capabilities (U)


(U) (S) The latest estimates (1968) on the strength, training, logistical support, and command-and-control capabilities of the CTO are as follows:

- a. The CTO is estimated to have 800 to a 1,000 CTO members in the jungle. Less than 200 are original CTO from Malaya. These CTO members are armed and uniformed. In addition, there are at least 2,500 trained reserves living in the urban and rural areas. These reserves have received at least three months military training and political indoctrination. The CTO also has the support of approximately two-thirds of the rural population in the provinces of Songkhla, Yala, and Narathiwat.
- b. Training given by the CTO is both military and political. The military training is in small unit tactics and guerrilla warfare. The political training follows the Communist party line as dictated by Peking.
- c. Though the CTO has arms and ammunition enough to supply their forces in the jungle and to train the reserves, the majority of these arms are of World War II vintage, and parts and ammunition are difficult to obtain. The CTO has been buying arms and ammunition from any source available; however, the arms being purchased are usually old and not in the best of condition.
- d. The CTO depends on the support of the masses for their supplies. Every bit of logistical support is obtained locally.
- e. The command and control capability of the CTO still functions, though the transmittal of orders remains dependent on the use of hand-carried messages. The system would not be able to cope with a fast moving action. The chain of command is illustrated in Figure 2.

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FIGURE 2 CHAIN OF COMMAND OF THE CTO (U)

5. ^(U) ~~(C)~~ Psychological Operations (U)

^(U) ~~(C)~~ A large amount of data has been collected to illustrate the psychological operations of the CTO. Translations are held at OSD/ARPA RDFU-T.

^(U) ~~(C)~~ Each State Committee/Regiment publishes a monthly paper. Though this paper parrots the Peking party line, there are particular articles geared to the local operational area of the State Committee/Regiment concerned. In addition to these monthly papers, the CTO periodically publishes propaganda concerning a particular event or a Communist holiday.

6. ^(U) ~~(C)~~ Recruiting Techniques (U)

^(U) ~~(C)~~ The CTO recruits for many varied, but CTO supported, organizations. The techniques for recruiting members of front or satellite organizations differ from those used to recruit members of the jungle forces. The recruiting techniques and the process the recruit goes through as he moves up through the various organizations are designed to

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assure the CTO that the recruit is both loyal to the organization and thoroughly trained.

7. (U)
(S) Front and Satellite Organizations (U)

(U) (S) There are a number of front and satellite organizations sponsored by the CTO. These organizations are directed by the CTO to maintain control, spread propaganda, and obtain support. The organizations are usually referred to by the term Masses Organizations.

(U) (S) The most important of the satellite organizations is the MCYL* (Malaysian Communist Youth League). Front organizations such as the Village Association, Women's Sections, Youth Corps, Young Vanguard, etc. have been established throughout the CTO operational area.

(U) (S) The following descriptions of the Village Association and the Women's Section, which were assembled from data available in reports on and translations of CTO documents available at the Regional Border Committee Office, Songkhla, Thailand, indicate the purpose and activities of such front organizations.

a. (U)
(S) Village Association (Kong Moon Kung Wui) (U)

(U) (S) The purpose of the Village Association is to organize the village elders into a cohesive group that will support CT activity. This group would be indoctrinated and used by the CTO to maintain control over the village.

* (U) See F. Osanka, "Malaysia Communist Youth League: A Case Study of Communist Population Control in Southern Thailand (U)," OAD-RM4923-6, SRI, January 1967.

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(U) (C) The activities of the Village Association cover every facet of village life, including all of the following.

- Solve disputes.
- Strengthen village unity.
- Promote friendship and mutual respect.
- Maintain village security.
- Oppose crime and corruption.
- Work for the public welfare.
- Promote education for young and old.
- Promote the ideals of hard work, sincerity, and honesty.

(U) (C) Though all these activities appear worthwhile, the CTO uses them to further its own ends. The general purpose of these activities is to unify the village under CTO direction and to provide support for CTO activities in the area. The villager soon realizes that the village association is not formed for his benefit, but rather as a means to control his activities. The villager must be loyal to the association and follow its directives or find himself punished, fined, or ostracized by his fellow villagers. The villager who does not conform is thus guilty of crimes or corruption or both, as defined by the CTO.

(U) (C) The member soon realizes that the association (in fact, the cadres committee) defines what is right or wrong and punishes or rewards as it deems fit. The member is thus at the mercy of the association and must conform.

(U) (C) Through the Village Association, the CTO is especially active in the field of education. Basic Communist ideology is promoted. The purpose is to educate the members and the youth of the village to be "progressive," to resist the old society (Royal Thai Government), and to develop "idealistic morality" (support the CTO).

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(U)
(C) The organization of the Village Association is illustrated in Figure 3.




FIGURE 3 ORGANIZATION OF VILLAGE ASSOCIATION (C)

(U)
(C) The association is based on the village unit and divided into a number of cells. The members general meeting is the highest organ of the association and is convened by the Cadres Committee. The Cadres Committee is the association's organ for conducting day-to-day business; it is elected by the members general meeting. The Cadres Committee is composed of three to five members, i.e., Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer, etc. The chairman presides over both the members general meeting and Cadres Committee meetings. The secretary develops activities, provides liaison for members, mobilizes manpower, and handles correspondence. The treasurer manages the Village Association's finances, collects subscriptions, and manages the welfare program. The Cadres Committee also maintains close liaison with other organizations within the village.

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(U) (C) Village elders or middle-aged residents of the village that support the association's aims and obey its rules and regulations can join when recommended by a member and approved by the members general meeting. On acceptance by the association, the new member must pay a 30 baht* entrance fee. The monthly subscription is set at 5 baht.

(U) (C) Male youths at the village can, with the consent of the members general meeting, join as honorary members without paying an entrance fee, but they must pay a 2 baht monthly subscription. The honorary member can attend meetings and express his views. He is required to support the various activities of the association.

(U) (C) Membership is denied anyone who has committed any act detrimental to the Village Association (or CTO) or who is not a permanent resident of the village.

(U) (C) Members have the right to attend meetings, to speak, to nominate, to be elected, and to vote. Members are also eligible for the various welfare services sponsored by the association. The members of the association are obliged to obey all the rules and regulations of the association, support association activities, implement programs, develop association affairs, support village unity, and protect all association secrets.

(U) (C) b. Women's Section

(U) (C) The purpose of the Women's Section is essentially to complement the all-male Village Association in organizing the female villagers into a cohesive group that will support CT activity.

* 1 baht = US\$.05.

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
(U)

(C) The aim of the Women's Section is divided into five categories as follows:

- Village unity--Solve disputes and engender peaceful coexistence and friendliness among the village women.
- Education--Teach the women to be thrifty, have simple wants, and to respect all other persons and show concern for them.
- Children--Teach the children to be sincere, honest, fair, just, and thrifty. The children should also be taught to have respect for manual labor, their parents and relatives, and to discontinue bad habits. The children should be directed to engage in proper activities and become progressive and capable persons.
- Women's rights--Sympathize with the problems of the village women and show concern for their vital interests, promote mutual aid, and protect their natural rights.
- Moral standard--Raise the moral standards and the value of virtue, and support all causes favorable to the people.

(U)

(C) The organization of the Women's Association is illustrated in Figure 4.



CELS (Number depends on size of the village)

(U)

FIGURE 4 ORGANIZATION OF THE WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION (C)

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(U)
(C) The Women's Section is based on the village unit and divided into a number of cells. The Women's Section member general meeting is the highest organ of the organization and is convened by the Cadres Committee. The Cadres Committee is usually composed of four members, i.e., Chairman, Secretary, Clerk, and Treasurer. The election of Cadres Committee members will be conducted at regular periods as designated by the members general meeting. Cadres Committee members can be re-elected.

(U) (C) The duties of the Cadres Committee members are as follows:

- Chairman--The chairman presides over the general meetings and Cadres Committee meetings and is responsible for all the activities of the organization.
- Secretary--The secretary develops the activities of the organization and provides liaison for the members.
- Clerk--The clerk handles all correspondence and conducts propaganda/education activities.
- Treasurer--The treasurer is in charge of collecting entrance fees and subscriptions and managing the financial matters of the organization.

(U) (C) Female residents of the village, middle aged or older, who support the aims of the section and follow its rules, after being recommended by a member in good standing and approved by the Cadre's meeting, will be invited to join the Women's Section. The potential member will then be requested to pay an initiation fee of 10 baht (approximately US\$.50) and a monthly subscription fee of 2 baht. If the potential member agrees, she will then become a member of the organization.

(U) (C) Young women, residents of the village, who support the aims of the Section, follow its rules, and are recommended by a member in good standing, will be invited to join the organization as honorary members after approval is given by the Cadres. As an honorary member,

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the young woman is required to pay an initiation fee of only 5 baht (approximately US\$.25); the monthly subscription is not required.

(U) (S) Nonresidents and women whose past conduct is considered detrimental to the organization are not eligible for membership.

(U) (S) Rights enjoyed by members of the Women's Section are to attend meetings, to speak, to nominate, to be elected, and to vote. The members are obliged to obey all rules and regulations of the organization, protect the organizational unity by observing security and protecting its secrets, support organizational activities, implement programs, and develop association affairs.

(U) (S) General meetings, Cadres meetings, and cell meetings can be convened at any time as conditions warrant. Meetings are not restricted as to procedure and are conducted as open meetings, where all members have the right to speak at any time. The minutes of the Cadres meetings or a meeting report should be made available to the members general meeting.

(U) (S) Members that have complied with, or made contributions to the implementation, of the five aims will be suitably commended or rewarded by the Women's Section, if such activities are considered to warrant such commendations or awards. On each International Women's Day, March 8, outstanding women will be selected for special recognition or bestowed with honorary titles such as "Model Mother," "Model-In-Law," "Model Daughter," etc.

(U) (S) 8. Activities of the CTO in South Thailand (C)

(U) (S) The activities of the CTO in the five southern provinces of Thailand are varied, but most of them seem to be geared toward winning

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over the masses and building up their own capabilities so that they can oppose the Royal Thai Government, militarily or otherwise.

(U)
a. (S) General (U)

(U) (S) The following data have been extracted from 1967 intelligence reports, by the RBCO, Songkla, Thailand. They illustrate the kind of activities conducted by the CTO in southern Thailand:

(U)
(1) (S) CT Sightings (U)

(U) (S) There were 612 reports of CT being sighted during the reporting period of January 1 through December 15, 1967. A tabulation of sightings is contained in Table 1 by month, regimental area, and approximate numbers of CT sighted. These reports are obtained from actual sightings by villagers and intelligence agents.

(U)
(2) (S) Recruiting (U)

(U) (S) During the 1967 reporting period there was a confirmed total of 123 individuals recruited into the CTO ranks. In addition, there was one report of 41 individuals from the 10th Regiment area that had been recruited; however, many of these people left the CTO and returned to their villages.

(U) (S) The total of 123 does not include those who were given only a short political and military training course and then returned to their village.

(U)
(3) (S) Supplies (U)

(U) (S) A very efficient supply network is in operation in each of the three regimental areas. The data from the reporting

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Table 1
CT SIGHTINGS BY NUMBER, REGIMENT, AND MONTH (C)
(January 1 through December 15, 1967)

Number of CT Sighted	Number of Sightings												No Date [†]	Regt
	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May*	June*	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec		
1-5	23	7	11		2	2	3	8	7	7	1	4	14	8
	2	4	9	5	4	2	3	6	11	7	5		3	10
	9	11	12	8	5	7	12	8	15	10	7		11	12
6-10	1	3	8	3	2	2	3	2	1	1	1		5	8
	1	2	2	3	1	2	4	3	3	3	1		1	10
	2	5	9	4	2	1	2	2	2	9	4	1	13	12
11-20	3	2	4				1	1	1	1	1		3	8
			1		1	1	1	1	2	2			1	10
21-50	2	4	5	2	1	2	4	10	3	3	1	1	3	12
	1							3			2		1	8
51-100	3	2	5	2	1	4	3	4	1	3	2		7	12
		1	1				1	2	2				3	10
			1											8
101 or more	1	1	1			1	1	1	1				2	12
													1	10
														12
Unknown Number†	4	1	2		1	2	4	3	3				4	8
		1	1	1	1	2	4	3	3	3			17	10
	11	3	6	3	1	1	2	3	2	1	4		26	12

* During May and June 1967, groups of 20 to 30 CT were reported moving from Betong to Sadao (12th to 8th Regiment) toward Satul. The total number of CT were estimated at approximately 300. These data are not included in the table.

† A number of reports do not indicate exact number of CT, but only indicate a group or a number of CT. In many cases the report did not indicate the month the sighting took place, in this case the entry was made in the "no date" column.

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(U) ~~(S)~~

period indicates that the CTO purchases its supplies through a support organization made up of trusted MCYL and masses organization members. The supplies include everything from food and medicine to building material, clothing, and electric generators.

(U) ~~(S)~~ (4) ~~(S)~~ Subscriptions (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ The CTO continues to collect monthly subscriptions from rubber tappers, tin miners, owners of small rubber holdings, and large estate owners. The subscription rate is based on income, and during periods of low income, the CTO will reduce the rate or accept payment in kind. For example, the following figures indicate the collections of the 2nd District (one of four districts) of the 12th Regiment:

Dec 1962 to Jan 1963	315,475 baht
Feb 1963 to May 1963	293,814
Dec 1963 to May 1964	332,307
Apr 1964 to Jan 1965	1,120,307
Feb 1965 to May 1965	62,389
	<hr/>
	2,124,292 baht

(U) ~~(S)~~ (5) ~~(S)~~ Arms and Ammunition (U)

(U) The CTO continues to obtain arms and ammunition through its support network. The guns and ammunition are varied and in most cases obtained from professional gun smugglers. However, the CTO does have a proven capability to manufacture weapons in jungle armories and to reload ammunition.

(U) ~~(S)~~ (6) ~~(S)~~ Supporter Activity (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ The main activity of CTO supporters is to obtain supplies for CTO consumption. However, the supporters also spread CTO propaganda to the masses and perform special missions for the CTO.

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(7) ^(U)
(U) ~~(S)~~ CTO Meeting with the Masses (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ During 1967, the CTO held at least ten meetings per month with the masses with special emphasis in the 12th Regiment Area. These meetings were held to indoctrinate the masses or to instruct them in special duties. The CTO propaganda line has slowly been becoming more and more anti-Royal Thai Government. The substance of many of these meetings during the latter half of 1967 has been as follows:

- There is no real freedom in Thailand.
- The Thai government does not take care of the people.
- There is no discrimination in communistic countries.
- Thailand will be communistic within two years.
- Thailand is an American colony.
- Thanom's government is not the government of the Thai people and will soon collapse.
- Pridi is the Thai government's representative and will shortly return to Thailand. Pridi is the true friend of the CTO.
- The Thai/Muslim provinces should be independent; they are suppressed by the Thai government.
- The villagers must give material and financial support to the CTO.

(8) ^(U)
(U) ~~(S)~~ Distribution of Propaganda (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ Each regiment publishes a monthly newspaper that is anti-British, anti-Malaysian, and anti-American. The "Awakening News" and "Peoples Vanguard" are examples of these publications. Examples of CTO propaganda are given in the following pages.

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- A letter apologizing for an encounter is cited below:

TO ALL RESPECTABLE THAI MILITARY OFFICERS AND OTHER RANKS

We regarded the shooting incident on 20 Mar 67 a very unfortunate one. In this incident we were not on the offensive but more on the defensive.

After the shooting had begun, we repeatedly begged you to retreat but you did not comply and instead you kept on firing at us. We were therefore forced to retaliate in order to protect ourselves. We also invited you to take away your wounded men and we stopped shooting.

We never regarded the Thai soldiers our enemies. Here we apologise to your men who have been wounded and we sympathize with them. We request you to convey our concern to their relatives.

Dear brethren, we have tried to avoid the incident and we hope in future that all brethren will also avoid all clashes. All these incidents will not benefit you and neither will they benefit us. On the contrary, it will only benefit the British Imperialists and TENGKU ABDUL RAHMAN clique.

With Friendliness
Mobile Unit of the Malayan
National Liberation Army

20 Mar 67

- A warning to Thai officials against associating with Americans is cited below:

TRANSLATION

Addressed to: NAI SAWAI EIRIMONCKHON
District Officer, SADA0

"HEART TO HEART TALK BETWEEN YOU AND US"

We, the Malayan National Liberation Army as very well known to you, are having a very hard time in view of our combat mobility from place to place. We realize that we own THAILAND a great deal for its kindness and we have never betrayed the

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Thai people, Government and THAILAND. We pledged constant friendship. Although we are already in hardship, we are still subject to constant attacks by Thai Police soldiers. Every such attack has been initiated by you. Despite your hostile attitude, we have avoided clashes with all of you every time. We need not have to raise tension so as to cause unnecessary loss of lives. We have constantly declared that we are not your enemies yet you still accuse us for being so. Our enemies are the British and TUNGKU ABDUL RAHMAN and without first giving thought to the past, future and current circumstances surrounding you, you still turn round to hunt for us. In spite of our love for the country, you still give us such treatment. If you consider carefully, you will realize that we have not caused any damage to your country. At the moment, your country is likened to a person suffering from cancer, the symptoms of which have not yet been detected. Once the disease becomes severe, that is the time you squirm in pain biting your teeth and shutting your eyes. The moment you open your eyes, you find your national flag missing only to be replaced by the flag of the American Imperialists, to which will be added another star which symbolizes the Kingdom of THAILAND. Reason that out for yourself. are not the American Imperialists your enemies? The Americans behave like millionaires. Outwardly they appear to be philanthropists but in their hearts they are sinful. Soon it will come to pass that - from the time you leave you home to fight us until the time you return home - you find your children with red hair because the American Imperialists are noted, from time immemorial, for spoiling Thai culture and customs. If you consider carefully, you are not duty bound to interfere with our work. We are already in difficulty, so leave us alone since we are duty bound to be so. Very soon we will be leaving THAILAND and then we will be watching you fight with the Americans. Even if you are not fighting us you still receive your salary. You will be more comfortable to live with your children. If you, with proper reasons, believe us, we will help you to fight the Americans. We hope that after considering what we have suggested, you will have a clearer vision.

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On our part we declare that as from now on, we will immediately fight the American Imperialists if they intrude into our operational areas. If, however, there are Thai policemen in their company, we express our sorrow.

COMBAT UNIT MALAYAN NATIONAL
LIBERATION ARMY
No: 1 UNIT
23 FEBRUARY 1967

Although you have not fought with us but you are still our potential enemy.

(U) This kind of propaganda is distributed to the masses and/or mailed to Thai officials.

(U) (C) The CTO also have the capability to show films and use recorded messages from highly placed CT and high ranking Chinese Communists from Red China. One of the films used is titled "The Outcome of the Vietnam War."

(U) (C) (9) (C) Training (U)

(U) (C) Information from intelligence reports indicates that the CTO conduct many training programs on varied subjects. The Hsueh Hsih (study classes) are conducted in the villages to indoctrinate the masses with communist ideology. Training in jungle camps is composed of both political indoctrination and military training. The jungle courses vary in length from one week to three months. The graduates of these schools return to their villages; however, in some cases, honor graduates remain in the jungle and are assigned to operational units.

(U) (10) (C) Medical Aid (U)

(U) (C) A number of reports indicate that the CTO has medically trained CT that work in the villages giving injections and prescribing

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medications. Reports from former CT indicate that medicines may range from the latest antibiotics to Chinese herb medicines. The CTO medical aid program also includes lectures on village sanitation and general housekeeping.

(U)
(11) (S) Assassinations, Abductions and Harrassment (U)

(U) (S) During the time period covered by this report there were:

18 assassinations

17 abductions

4 injuries inflicted

22 cases of intimidation

3 persons detained for short periods

by the CTO in the three regimental areas.

(U)
(12) (S) Surveillance and Impersonation of Security Forces (U)

(U) (S) The satellite and front organization of the CTO maintain close surveillance of all security force troop movements and report such information as rapidly as possible to CTO authorities. The CTO thus has a very efficient information network. There were several instances reported where CT posed as security force personnel and moved through the area, visiting villages.

(U)
(13) (S) CT Camps (U)

(U) (S) There were a number of CT camp locations reported to security force personnel; however, the information was usually several

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days old and the approximate location was quite vague. When information was acted on and the camp was found, it was almost always abandoned. The number of camps that have been found indicate that the CT have a vast network of camps, resting places, and courier posts available to them.

(U) ~~(S)~~ (U)
(14) ~~(S)~~ Tunnels and Caves (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ Reports and discoveries by security force personnel indicate that the CT use natural caves for temporary camps and supply caches. Two reports indicate that the CT have dug tunnels within camp areas for storage and possible escape routes.

(U) ~~(S)~~ (U)
(15) ~~(S)~~ Satellite and Front Organizations (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ Numerous front organizations sponsored by the CTO exist in the south of Thailand. Reports and captured CT documents indicate that every facet of daily life of the villagers is affected by these organizations. There are rubber tapper's unions, tin miner's unions, youth groups, Women's Associations, and Village Associations.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The Malaysian Communist Youth League (MCYL) is considered to be the most important CTC satellite organization. It is the training and proving ground for the potential CTO member.

(U) ~~(S)~~ (U)
(16) ~~(S)~~ Schools (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ Besides the training schools mentioned earlier, the CTO has managed to infiltrate the education system of the Thai government and, in one reported case, had established a communist-sponsored school in Weng District that was supported by government funds.

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(U) (C) b. Specific (U)

(U) (C) The following brief description of a recently captured CT camp indicates specific CT activities.*

(U) (C) The camp, which was captured on January 21, 1967, was located at QY 8222. It was capable of supporting 200 persons and was approximately 200 yards by 50 to 75 yards in size. It was composed of 29 sleeping shelters, three kitchens, one classroom, one large meeting hall, an armory, and a darkroom.

(U) (C) The large meeting hall could seat over 100 people and had a stage that opened out into the basketball court. The stage could be used either as a platform for delivering speeches or presenting entertainment or as a stand from which to view basketball games. The armory was located under the stage.

(U) (C) Approximately 97 negatives of photographs were found in the camp. The pictures presented pictorial evidence of activities carried on in the camp. Figures 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, are some photographs developed from these negatives.

(U) (C) The Ma Li Hsueh Hsiao (Marx-Lenin School) shown in Figure 3 is similar to such schools erected in various villages for a short period of time. The purpose of these schools is to indoctrinate the villagers with Communist ideology. A civic action program is also conducted while the school is in the area. Transcriptions of the Chinese on the arch in the photograph are as follows:

At the left: "People fight to bury the Lon-Communists."

Top Center: "Ma Li School." (Ma-Li is the abbreviation for Marx and Lenin.)

At the right: "Marx Lenin School guides people to convert."

* (U) This material is abstracted from another SRI report by Robert Morse, CT Training Camp, TN-26, June 1967.

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



FIGURE 5 MA LI HSUEH HSIAO (MARX-LENIN SCHOOL) (U)

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FIGURE 6 CT MEETING HELD TO CELEBRATE THE "FIFTH FIGHTING WEEK" OF THE 8TH PLATOON (U)



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FIGURE 7 THE 8TH PLATOON (U)

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


FIGURE 8 THE 8TH PLATOON PASSING IN REVIEW (U)

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
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FIGURE 9 AUTOMATIC WEAPONS SECTION (U)

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FIGURE 10 FORMATION OF CT ON BASKETBALL COURT (U)

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FIGURE 11 CHILDREN'S CHORUS PERFORMING AT A COMMUNIST-SPONSORED CELEBRATION (U)



FIGURE 12 CT-SPONSORED FEAST FOR THE MASSES (U)

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(U) (S) The meeting shown in Figure 6 is being held to celebrate the "Fifth Fighting Week" of the 8th Platoon, as indicated by the white banner suspended above the podium. The white placard, in the lower center of the picture, is the charter of the 8th Platoon in Chinese. The five pictures under the arch are of Mao, Stalin, Lenin, Marx, and Engels.

(U) (S) Figure 7 is a photograph of the 8th Platoon as identified by the battle flag. There are 63 members present, and they are assembled in front of the large meeting hall, as indicated by the banner under the arch. The inscription on the arch reads, "Malayan People's Revolutionary Army." The vertical banner on the left reads, "The respected men of the party sincerely lead the people to success." The one on the right reads, "The great red flag strongly leads the people to victory."

(U) (S) Figure 9 is a photograph of the 8th Platoon passing in review and receiving the Communist salute from four high ranking CT officials.

(U) (S) The photograph in Figure 10 illustrates the automatic weapons section armed with a British Bren gun of World War II vintage. The weapon held by the CT squatting next to the gunner is an example of CT manufacture.

(U) (S) The group of children pictured in Figure 12 is performing at a Communist-sponsored celebration. The four large Chinese ideographs on the curtain below the flags read, "Thanksgiving Ceremony."

(U) (S) In Figure 12, note the uniformed CT females in the foreground.

(U) (S) In addition to the 97 negatives, a large number of documents were discovered. A few of these have been translated. Translations are available at the EBCO, Songkhla, Thailand and RDFU-T, OSD/ARPA, Bangkok, Thailand.

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(U) This camp represents only a small part of the activity of the CTO in the south of Thailand, however, it illustrates the success that they have had.

B. (U) The Separatists (U)

(U) In many ways the most sensitive law and order problem facing the Thai government, and one that still demands a great deal of its attention, is that of the so-called Separatists. Their goals are purely political-- aimed at either replacing Thai-Buddhist officials with Thai-Islam and reducing the scope of governmental authority in the southern region or at detaching the border provinces from Thailand. It is from the latter alternative that the term "Separatist" is derived. The problem is difficult because many Separatist leaders are former Thai-Islam who are now living in Kelantan, Malaysia. Consequently, they are out of reach of the Thai Government. Also, most Thai-Islam people have never been affected by Separatist activities and, therefore, are somewhat inclined to view action taken against Separatists as simply police repression. It is difficult for the Thai government to distinguish among those Thai-Islam who are active in organizations or movements that espouse some form of Separatism and those who merely voice complaints against government policies or the behavior of individual bureaus or police forces.

(U) Efforts to detach at least the four Moslem provinces (those where the Thai-Islam constitute a majority of the population) from Thailand's control are not new. Indeed, some of the deposed rulers from Pattani who fled to Malaysia late in the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries soon sought to recapture their thrones through intrigue and violence, and some of their descendants continued their attempts. But with the passage of time and the death of former rulers and their descendants, Thai-Islam memories of the old regimes waned, and it became increasingly difficult for later descendants to arouse much popular

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support in the border provinces. Moreover, the British colonial rulers refuse to support their activities, preferring to keep cordial relations with Thailand so that it could serve as a buffer between British and French colonial holdings on the mainland of Southeast Asia.

(U) Conditions appeared to become more favorable for former royalty and others with separatist tendencies shortly after the end of World War II. The chauvinistic policies of the Pibun government aroused considerable resentment among the Thai-Isan, a resentment, however, that was expressed openly only after Pibun's first downfall. This resentment turned to fear that his policies would be reimposed when he returned to power in 1948. At about that same time (1948), Malaya acquired some vestiges of autonomy, at least in its internal affairs. It became fully independent in 1957 and merged with other territories to become Malaysia in 1960. Now Separatists could exploit popular discontent in the border provinces without, hopefully, intervention from the authorities in Malaysia.

(U) The year 1948, then, witnessed an outbreak of Separatist activities on a scale theretofore unknown. An organization called Gampar was established with its base in Malaya, and it began to propagandize in favor of secession of the border provinces from Thailand and their merger with Malaya. Gampar operated a factory in Singapore where Separatist badges were manufactured. It was through a raid on this factory that the British became fully aware of the goals and activities of this movement. The factory was closed by the embarrassed British, and some of the leaders were arrested, while information was provided Thai authorities that enabled them to take measures in the five provinces. These measures quickly put most Gampar agents out of action.

(U) Within the border provinces, other Separatist movements developed, and their activities intensified, though they took different forms.

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For instance, one of the local leaders of the Thai-Islam (Haji Sulong) submitted a petition to the Government in which he asked for several administrative concessions to the Thai-Islam. There was to be a Thai-Islam high commissioner for these provinces who would oversee their administration, and this administration was to be filled largely with Thai-Islam. Malay, as well as Thai, was to become an official language for these provinces. Though this petition came to naught and the individual who submitted it was arrested and jailed, similar proposals were made by other Thai-Islam. For example, a group of Thai-Islam, including members of Parliament, called for the establishment of a committee of Thai-Islam from the border provinces. This committee was to be chaired by the Chularaj-montri and was to handle most of the major items of internal administration for the four Moslem provinces. Certainly these proposals were a far cry from demands for independence or merger with Malaya. However, the Government viewed them as insistence on virtual autonomy and suspected that this would be the first step toward eventual independence of the four Moslem provinces. Therefore these proposals were also rejected. But the most serious and clearly Separatist-inspired event was a disturbance in 1948 (partially touched off by the aforementioned activities and developments) that inspired armed rebellion by several thousand Thai-Islam in Narathiwat.

(U) It is difficult to ascertain the exact role played by former Thai-Islam royalty in what happened in Narathiwat. Many of the Thai-Islam now living in the area where the revolt took place recall that some of the leaders of the revolt--at least after it had started--came from Kelantan as well as from Pattani. In any event the revolt began in Village No. 6 Chene Commune, Rangae District, and quickly spread to several

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
other villages in that Commune.* (See Figure 13.) By the time the Thai police arrived in sufficient numbers, the insurgents had taken control of a large section of the commune (which has the largest population of any in Rangae and which is soon to become a subdistrict) and were advancing in the direction of the district center. It was difficult for the police to reach the disturbance because there were no roads at that time into that area and it took several hours to walk there from police headquarters at the district center. Little reliable information about exact numbers of insurgents and police who participated in the fighting or of casualties was made available to the public. However, it is clear that, after an initial setback, the Thai police encountered no real difficulty in crushing the uprising.†

(U) The government has tried to ensure that there will not be a repetition of insurrection in this particular area. It encouraged a private company to build a good laterite road, which is usable all year for a distance of about 9.3 miles from Tanya Ma, the administrative center of Rangae and the railway depot for Narathiwat town, to Village No. 1 in Chene Commune. Another road from Village No. 1 to Village No. 4, a distance of about 6.8 miles, was built more recently by an MDU that has its headquarters in Ruso District. This second road is built of laterite for part of the distance and of dirt the rest of the way. A BPP detail was

* (U) Among those villages, three--Villages No. 4, 6, and 8--are still considered to be significant because they are located in the center of the area in which the uprising took place; also some of the people from these villages fled to Malaysia after the revolt failed, but still retained contact with their relatives and friends.

† (U) Estimates of total casualties range from less than 90 to several hundred. There are also some estimates that as many as 2,000 of the Thai-Isam who participated in the uprising fled across the border into Kelantan or elsewhere.

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FIGURE 13 LOCATION OF SEPARATIST UPRISING OF 1948 IN AMPHOE RANGAE, NARATHIWAT CHANGWAT (U)

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temporarily stationed in the vicinity of Village No. 4, but was replaced a few years ago by a subunit of the MDU. The headquarters of this subunit is in Village No. 4.

(U) Since the quelling of the 1948 uprising, Separatists have apparently participated in only a few violent incidents. Separatist agents do operate in the border provinces, some propaganda has been disseminated, and the Thai police do make periodic arrests. Also, PMIP, one of the political parties in Malaya, took up the cause of the Separatists. PMIP urged that the border provinces be detached from Thailand and merged with Malaya. While other Malayan political parties and the Government of the Federation of Malaya quickly disavowed this argument, the PMIP as well as individual Separatist organizations in Kelantan were free to espouse this position publicly. News of their position reached the border provinces, where the remaining hard-core Separatists were heartened and strengthened by it. By 1963 the "Confrontation" between the new Federation of Malaysia and Indonesia was underway, and there were indications that Indonesian agents were working with at least some members of the PMIP and some of the Separatists in Kelantan. They were also establishing contacts with Separatists in the border provinces. Shortly thereafter, unconfirmed reports began to reach Thai authorities to the effect that the CTO was cooperating with these Indonesian agents, and the authorities feared such cooperation could lead to CTO support of Thai-Islam Separatists. Moreover, in 1964 and 1965, the police claimed to have uncovered evidence that a large Separatist network was functioning in the region and that it possibly had some communist ties.

(U) It is within this framework of events that the Thai authorities took firm action against these Thai-Islam in the border provinces who were suspected either of belonging to this network or of being otherwise active in Separatist activities. The police arrested most of these suspects in

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late 1965 and early 1966. Among those initially arrested were several prominent members of the Thai-Islam community. Some were later released after being cleared by further police investigation or because the police could not obtain enough evidence against them. Many others had still not been brought to trial a year later; they were being held in jail while further police investigations were conducted. A few other Thai-Islam were arrested in the remaining months of 1966, and by the end of that year Thai authorities, or in any event those stationed in the border provinces, appeared satisfied that most of the local Separatist leaders had been immobilized.

(U) It is possible to draw some tentative conclusions about the Separatist problem. First, many traditional and transitional elites from among the Thai-Islam sympathize with Separatism, but most of these have never given voice to their sympathies, and fewer still have participated in Separatist activities or joined Separatist organizations, in part because they fear the possible consequences and in part because they realize that the secession of the Moslem provinces from Thailand is not feasible. Second, the great majority of the Thai-Islam peasantry has little or no interest in Separatism, though most are at least vaguely aware of Separatist arguments. Third, there is no single Separatist movement that controls or coordinates all who are engaged in Separatist activities. Rather, there are many organizations and less formal groups. They operate independently and often have different, if not totally contradictory, goals. There are grounds for believing that further fragmentation will take place within these movements since the Separatists are, by and large, without local leaders as a result of the recent arrests. In addition, many Kelantan leaders have gone to other places in Malaysia in the past few years because they can frequently earn a better living elsewhere.

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(U) The Thai authorities are faced with several dilemmas as regards the Separatists. They must employ police measures to keep Separatist activity under control, but in the process of doing so they risk alienating many Thai-Islam. They must use enough force--and use it promptly--to prove effective in dealing with real threats to the security of this region, while on the other hand an "overkill" reaction by the police could provoke an uprising. The Separatist problem, then, has been and will probably remain for some time potentially explosive and will pose one of the most serious obstacles to the Government's attempt to maintain law and order in the border provinces.

C. (U) Bandit Gangs (U)

(U) Bandit gangs are found in other regions of Thailand, including the area around Bangkok. But they pose a special problem in the border provinces because the bandits are Thai-Islam, who can usually obtain the cooperation of their own people, while the police are largely Thai-Buddhists, who must function in a somewhat alien atmosphere. Moreover, there is always the danger that one or more of these gangs will either cooperate with or become the tools of the Separatists or the CIO.

(U) Banditry, as distinguished from thievery, includes the threat or use of violence, usually armed violence. Most of the bandits in the southern region rely primarily on the threat of armed violence or the display of weapons to obtain money and property. Some bandits operate singly or in pairs, while others are organized into larger gangs. The gangs create the greatest problem to the Thai authorities.

(U) The better known bandit gangs are based in an area that centers around Mayo District (Pattani) but includes large sections of adjoining or nearby districts such as Yarang (Pattani), Raman (Yala), Bacho (Sarawathiwat), and Saiburi (Pattani). Some of these bandit groups occasionally

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extend their operations from time to time to nearby areas in Muang (Yala), Khok Pho (Pattani), Panare (Pattani), and even less occasionally to Ieso (Narathiwat). This general area is one of rough terrain (mountains, rubber plantations, and forests) and until recently has had few and very poor roads. Aside from Thai-Buddhist officials and policemen and a handful of Chinese merchants, the people living in this area are Thai-Islam. The bandits feel relatively secure among their own, particularly among villagers who are either friends or relatives. They exact tribute from large plantation owners and from some of the merchants. But they seldom bother poor Thai-Islam, except when the latter are suspected of giving information to the police about bandit activity. Some of the commune and village headmen, wealthy land owners, and merchants in this area have been either killed or threatened with death because they were suspect. Villages from which one or more of the bandits originally come or where they have close relatives and friends are seldom bothered. But they do attack other villages on the periphery of this area, sometimes descending on such a village in a large group and forcing all of the villagers to give up their cash, jewelry, and movable property. Or they might extort money or property from the villagers on threat of either attacking the village or killing some of the inhabitants. Sometimes they construct temporary roadblocks on a particular road which runs along the edge of this area and stop all of the vehicles--robbing the passengers of valuables.

(U) To many Thai-Islam, especially those living in villages immune from attack or in villages or larger settlements outside this area, some of these larger bandit gangs appear in a somewhat romantic light. They seemingly live a carefree and exciting existence, frequently "tweaking the tiger's tail," so to speak, and thus challenging Government authority. This partly explains why young men from outside this area have joined these gangs. And the bandits are even more heroic in the eyes of relatives,

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friends, fellow villagers, and many others who live inside this area. Of course there are some living there who have little use for the bandits, but they are usually sufficiently intimidated by the bandits to remain silent. Moreover, they are forced to cooperate by hiding the bandits when the latter are pressed by the police, by informing them when the police are in the area, providing food and shelter, and even by providing information about well-to-do landowners and merchants. There is, therefore, a veritable network of people working on behalf of the bandits, and this cooperation makes the task of the police extremely difficult.

(U) To date, the police have concentrated on breaking up the larger bandit gangs on the assumption that once these have been destroyed, other bandit activities will decline. A Bandit Suppression Squad from Bangkok has worked closely with the provincial police stationed in those districts where the bandits are more active. Temporary roadblocks imposed on highways in the area, irregular timing of patrols so that the bandits won't know when the police patrol will visit a village, sudden visits by flying squads to villages suspected of harboring bandits, and constant and periodic interrogation of those believed to be cooperating with the bandits or sympathetic to them make it much more difficult for the gangs to move freely. The use of informers and the payment of rewards for information about the bandit leaders have applied psychological pressure against the latter and, in at least one case, have yielded results. Information received by the police sufficiently in advance enabled them to set up an ambush for Saw-Ma-Dang, the leader of one of the larger gangs. In the ensuing gun fight, which took place in Yarang in September 1963, Saw-Ma-Dang was killed. Also, the roads that have recently been constructed in the district will make it much easier for the authorities to keep track of the bandit's activities and for the police to get there faster when needed. And finally, the MDC has established its headquarters in Patani

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Commune (the heart of the bandit area in Mayo) and has a sub-headquarters in Tadong Commune (the heart of the bandit area on the other side of the mountain in Raman).

(U) The very fact that an MDU was stationed in this area is indicative not only of Government concern about banditry and its possible spread, but also of its concern that some of the bandits were cooperating with the Separatists. The belief in bandit and Separatist cooperation arose largely because one of the suspected Separatist leaders had considerable contact with various bandits. This suspected Separatist, Pok Su, comes from one of the oldest and most respected families in Village No. 2, Tadong Commune. Thai Government officials thought that perhaps he was recruiting bandits for the Separatist cause. But most of the provincial authorities, district officers, and district police commanders who are responsible for fighting banditry in this area appeared, by 1966, to be convinced that none of the gangs operating at that time had any political motives. Thai-Isam living in the area also express the belief that the bandits have no connection with or interest in Separatism. Even if there is no Separatist flavor to the activities of bandit gangs the intensification of police efforts, the building of the roads, and the stationing of the MDU in this area are still necessary to reduce bandit activity and prevent its spread elsewhere.

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(U) III (U) COUNTERINSURGENCY SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAM (U)

(U) A. (U) Command and Control Organizations and Programs (U)

1. (C) General Border Committee (GBC) (U)

(U) The General Border Committee (GBC) is a joint Thai-Malaysian organization established to maintain security along their common border. The GBC itself meets quarterly or at the call of either of the cochairmen. The organization is illustrated by Figure 14.

(U) The GBC is currently jointly chaired by Tun Razak of Malaysia and Marshal Dawee of Thailand. The Committee is made up of equal numbers of Thai and Malaysian senior civil and police officials.

(U) The operating body of the GBC is the Regional Border Committee (RBC). The RBC is jointly chaired by the Chief Police Officer (CPO) of the state of Kedah, Malaysia, and the senior Police Officer of the 9th Region Provincial Police, Thailand. The RBC is scheduled to meet monthly or at the call of either cochairman.


(U) The RBC maintains a Regional Border Committee Office at Songkhla, Thailand. The RBCO was formerly known as the Combined Intelligence Headquarters (CIH).

(U) (U) The RBCO is composed of three divisions--Operations, Intelligence, and Administration.

(U) (U) The Operations Division is responsible for the conduct of joint Thai-Malaysian operations. It is jointly directed by the Commander, 9th Area Border Patrol Police (BPP) and the Commander, Malaysian Police Field Forces (PFF). There are basically three sections in the Operations Division--a planning section, a psy-war section, and a section composed

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FIGURE 14 ORGANIZATION OF GENERAL BORDER COMMAND (C)

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of operational troops. This last section is composed of one BPF and one Police Field Forces (PFF) platoon on ready alert that can be committed anywhere in the border area. In addition, there is one company of BPP and one of PFF that can be committed as reinforcements. These forces are available and can be committed by the RBCO without clearance from higher headquarters.

(U) ✓ The Administrative Division is responsible for all administrative matters pertinent to the operation of the RBCO and can be called on to assist the RBC. There are two sections in the Administrative Division-- records and files section and civilian staff section.

(U) ✓ The Intelligence Division is responsible for the collection, collation, and analysis of intelligence information. The Intelligence Division publishes weekly intelligence summaries, quarterly intelligence reviews, and special intelligence studies. All intelligence data that are pertinent to border control, particularly those concerning the activities of the CTO, gathered by Thai or Malaysian officials, regardless of their organization, are supposed to be reported to the RBCO. The Intelligence Division is the largest of the three divisions; it is composed of an operations section, a planning section, a research section, a security section, and a field team section.

(U) ✓ The intelligence data gathered by the field teams, in conjunction with all data collected from other sources, are analyzed by the operations section working with the research section. When the data are analyzed, they are turned over to the planning section which decides whether or not action should be taken. If a small operation is to be conducted, it will be accomplished by RBCO staff; but, if a larger operation is contemplated, the plan will be turned over to the Planning Division for action.

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(U) The security section is responsible for checking the reliability or background of information and sources of information.

2. (U) National Security Command (NSC) (U)

(U) The RACFO-T "Counterinsurgency Organizations and Programs in Northeast Thailand (U)," discusses the organization, objectives, and activities of the NSC and its affiliated elements. This section will examine the Mobile Development Units (MDUs) in the south, which function under the operational control of NSC.

(U) A certain amount of data is available concerning each of the following four MDUs which operate in south Thailand and which are shown on the map in Figure 15:

MDU-4, Narathiwat Province

MDU-5, Yala Province

MDU-12, Pattani Province

MDU-13, Satun Province

(U) The basic missions of the MDUs in South Thailand are to:

- Establish positive identification of the people of the target areas with the KTG.
- Assist rural development (public health and welfare, communications, productivity, etc.) in the target areas.
- Sponsor concentrated rural development in certain key villages that are particularly subject to dissidence.
- Survey the MDU area for long range rural development programs.
- Collect intelligence on subversive activities.

The entire theme of the program is the promotion of closer national government-to-rural-people relationships through demonstrated interest and action.

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



FIGURE 15 LOCATION OF MDUs IN THAI-MALAYSIA BORDER REGION (U)

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a. (U) MDU-1, Amphur Ru So, Saraburi Province (U)

(U) MDU-1 left Bangkok as a unit on September 9, 1963, arrived in Ru So on September 13, and commenced operations on September 16. MDU-1 is responsible for Amphurs Ru So and Rangek.

(U) The organization of MDU-1 is illustrated in Figure 16. The personnel breakdown shown in Table 2 indicates the shortages of trained personnel as of November 1967.



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FIGURE 16 ORGANIZATION OF MDU-4 (U)

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Table 2

(U) PERSONNEL AT MBI-1 (U)
(November 1967)

<u>Job Description</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>
Commander	1	1
Deputy Commander	1	0
S-1 (Logistics)	1	1
S-1 (Headquarters)	1	1
Signal Officer	1	0
Photo Officer	1	1
Radioman (NCO)	3	3
Clerk	2	2
Architect (NCO)	1	1
Photo (NCO)	1	0
Cooks (NCO)	3	3
Logistics (NCO)	1	1
Finance (NCC)	1	1
Mechanic (NCO)	1	1
Driver	10	10
Governor's Representative	1	1
Assistant Governor's Representative	2	2
Changwat Community Development Officer	4	3
Public Welfare Officer	1	0
Radioman (Police NCO)	1	1
Doctor	1	1
Health Officer	2	1
Nurse	1	1
Agriculture/Veterinarian	3	2
Community Development Officer	2	0
Education Officer	3	2
Public Relations Officer	2	0
Tractor Driver	1	1
Farmer Driver	1	1
Carpenter	2	2

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(U) The following equipment was operated in the area during 1967:

- 2 2-1/2-ton trucks (military)
- 1 dump truck, M.B.
- 2 3-4-ton trucks (military)--one truck has a winch
- 3 1-4-ton jeep vehicles
- 1 Land Rover
- 1 ambulance
- 1 bulldozer, D-5E
- 1 motor grader
- 1 Case 60 hp tractor
- 1 sheepfoot roller

(U) MDC-1 has three SSB (SBI-200-1399) radios. One is located at the MDC headquarters, one in Weng District, and one at Narathivat. The radio has six fixed frequencies and is in the NSC net.

(U) MDC-1 has established three model villages and has built or repaired schools, furnished educational materials, and improved wells and sanitary conditions in other villages. It has also introduced improved concepts in agriculture and animal husbandry and constructed a network of roads to ease the burden of transportation of produce to market. As an example of one phase of MDC-1's activities, the medical center at MDC-1 headquarters has treated 31,476 patients since September 18, 1964. The data in Table 3 illustrate the kinds of treatment given.

(U) Table 4 shows the budget that was approved and the operational plan that was being developed at the time of this report.

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Table 3

(U) TREATMENTS DISPENSED AT THE MEDICAL STATION
AT MDU-4 HQ QUARTERS (U)

	<u>July 1967</u>	<u>August 1967</u>
Malaria	161	132
Respiratory system	151	161
Gastro-intestinal system	82	79
Eye, ear, nose, and throat	25	31
Skin	153	112
Obstetrics and gynecology	24	25
Surgery (minor)	83	85
Vitamin deficiency	29	56
Miscellaneous	<u>163</u>	<u>116</u>
Total	1,103	1,069

Table 4

(U) PROJECTS AND BUDGET FOR THE YEAR 1968--
MDU-4, AMPHUR RU SO, NARATHIVAS (U)

Project No. 1	Promotion of rubber tapping and rubber sheet processing vocations	35,475 baht
Project No. 2	Promotion of basket and mat weaving industries	10,000 baht
Project No. 3	Public health	10,000 baht
Project No. 4	Deleted	
Project No. 5	Barber training	500 baht
Project No. 6	Education development	112,000 baht
Project No. 7	Promotion of planting and improved strain of rubber trees	9,400 baht
Project No. 8	Promotion of fruit tree orchards	8,000 baht
Project No. 9	Chicken raising	4,200 baht
Project No. 10	Fish breeding	6,000 baht
Project No. 11	Improvement and enlargement of the rural roads, Amphur Ru So	<u>53,925 baht</u>
Total		250,000 baht

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6. The MR-5 Bala Village, Amphur Yaha, Yala Province

(1) MR-5 left Bangkok as a unit on September 9, 1963 and began operations on site on September 18, 1963. MR-5 has been in the process of moving to a new location in Amphur Istong and data are available only as of January 1966.

(2) MR-5 is organized along the same lines as MR-4 and had the following equipment in operation as of January 1966:

- 5 automobiles
- 4 trucks
- 3 tractors
- 1 dump truck
- 1 road grader

MR-5 has four PSB (SRI-200-1399) radios. The radios are all tied into the MR net.

(3) During the period from September 1963 through January 1966, MR-5 members visited villages for the purpose of investigating living conditions and then supervised the construction of children's playgrounds, fish ponds, bridges, sanitary wells, monk's residences, village roads, and markets. They helped villagers to improve the appearance of their homes and to establish more sanitary methods of keeping house. They held 125 public meetings on such topics as the purpose of community development, the government's Southern Thailand Development Plan, the duties and responsibilities of the citizens in a free democratic society, and the appointment of a village committee for Bala and Patae. They suggested that Amphur Yaha construct four midwifery centers and constructed a model home in Bala. They arranged for 70 community leaders to take a field trip to important places in Yala. They offered lessons in cutting hair and gave free haircuts to villagers and school children; they also supplied school

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children with uniforms and educational materials. In addition, they selected an Islamic woman for whom the government granted a pilgrimage to Mecca.

(U) For the purpose of improving public relations, they passed out pictures, pamphlets, books, and maps that gave information about Thailand and MDO activities, including explanations of the government's policy and the purpose of community development. They took records and copies of MDO activities and showed them to the villagers, and they entertained the villagers with stage shows featuring local, traditional Thai, and modern Thai songs, and local drama. News about MDO activities was given on radio stations in Bangkok, Yala, Haadyai, and other cities, on television stations in Bangkok and Haadyai, and in Bangkok and local newspapers. The MDO-5 group took a survey of listeners to radio stations in Bangkok and the local districts and installed six radio receiving towers in the villages.

(U) To improve elementary education, they opened eight new elementary schools. They constructed or enlarged 10 permanent school buildings and constructed eight residences for teachers. They helped to construct sanitary wells and latrines at the schools and helped to design and construct school compounds. They provided the schools with books, teaching aids and other educational materials, playground supplies, and medical supplies. They instructed teachers in teaching methods and employed 17 new in-service teachers.

(U) In 1964, they selected 40 youths and sent them to the Annual Youth Jamboree in Bangkok. In 1965, they sent two.

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(U) To educate adults, they conducted elementary and intermediate classes for illiterates, which 391 adults attended and, in February, 1964 vocational education classes for 30 housewives. They also established the 30 Center Public Library.

(U) In Hale At Rais, MR-5 members established one Buddhist monastery and compound. Elsewhere, they constructed two monastery buildings, three residences for monks, and two sanitary wells at monasteries. In 1965, they hosted six monks during the Buddhist Lent.

(U) They allocated 300 baht to repair the Islamic mosque in Young Village and 500 baht to the mosque in Beece Village. In addition, they constructed seven sanitary wells for Islamic mosques.

(U) To improve agriculture, MR-5 members instructed villagers in animal husbandry and pen construction. They vaccinated animals and educated villagers in methods of protecting animals from disease. They encouraged villagers to improve the yields of rubber, coffee, fruit, sweet corn, and vegetables and to produce high-grade rubber sheets. To help the villagers, MR-5 members grew a demonstration high-yield rubber plant and demonstrated the production of a high-grade rubber sheet. They also demonstrated coffee cultivation and home gardening techniques.

(U) The activities conducted through the MR-5 health service, again for the period from September 1963 to January 1966, are listed in detail in Table 5. The information given in Table 5 was taken directly from MR-5 records.

c. (U) MR-12, Mai Yu, Pattani Province (U)

(U) This MDU is quite new in the area and is understaffed at present. Its organization, equipment, and communications capability is authorized at the same level as the other MDUs.

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Table 1

1. ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED THROUGH MEDICAL PLANT DAILY
September 1963 through January 1965

Medical care and immunization

Treatment	16,616 cases
Malarial cases	271
Malnutrition cases	124
Wound operations	104
Respiratory diseases	116
Gastrointestinal diseases	85
Acute cases taken to hospital	13 persons
Immunizations	
Smallpox vaccinations	3,091
Typhoid and cholera vaccinations	2,000

Sanitation development

Water Development	
Village water supply	1
Sanitary well with hand pump	23
Automatic valveless gravity filter	1
Privy Development	
Clay privies sold	100 sets
Construction advice	190 privies
Privy use advice*	

Sanitation Instruction

Malarial Control

- Insecticide spray*
- House-to-house malarial treatment*
- Malaria protection instruction*
- Sanitary improvement*

* The extent of these activities was not recorded.

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Intestinal Parasite Control for School Children

Number of tests	1,078
Number of positives	1,000
Number of positives and their ...	1,000
Number of positives	1,000

Intestinal Parasite Survey

Number of subjects	2,000
Number of positive patients	1,077
Total positive cases	1,077
Number of family ...	1,077
Number of ... only	1,077
Number of ... with positive ...	1,077
Number of ...	1,077
Total	411

Intestinal Parasite Control

Victory center construction*
 Instruction and advice to ...

Public Health

Sanitation improvement instruction*
 Privy construction for schools*
 Drinking water development*
 Health education*

Health Education

Nutrition advice*
 Information on the importance of having diseases treated*

Summary of diseases

Intestinal parasite	1,077
Tuberculosis	1,038
Malaria	27.06
Malnutrition	20.06

* The extent of these activities was not recorded.

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The main mission of the MR is to establish health care from health personnel in the health facilities. The MR is also responsible for a progressive road building program and the raising of the educational standards in its areas of responsibility.

d. MR-11, Lower Valley, or MR-11, Lower Valley Province

MR-11 was established at its present location in October 1965. The first year was spent in conducting a survey of the area. Its organizational structure is authorized at the same level of the other MRs, but it is considerably understaffed. This unit has also authorized equipment but its road, motor and payloader are inoperable, and the parts necessary to repair them are not available. MR-11 also has the highest RSI ratio and is in the SSC network.

This MR has constructed quite a few roads and has established three model villages. The following is a list of activities that are representative of those that are completed:

Road construction

Constructed	23.6 kilometers
Repaired	52.4 kilometers

Bridge construction

Constructed	28
Repaired	11

Schools

Built	1
Repaired	18

Wells

Dug	8
---------------	---

(1) From October 1964 to July 1967, the MR treated 11,626 patients. The kinds of treatments given are listed in Table 6.

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Table 6

(U) TREATMENTS GIVEN AT THE MDU-15 MEDICAL CENTER (U)
(October 1966 to July 1967)

Disease of the respiratory system	23.39%
Pulmonary tuberculosis	7.22%
Disease of the skin	15.34%
Nutritional disorders	14.09%
Helminthic infections	2.43%
Malaria fever	2.03%
Disease of the eyes	0.74%
Disease of the digestive system	5.67%
Minor surgery	0.09%
Disease of the kidney and urinary system	0.98%
Accidental wound	0.16%
Other diseases	27.86%

(U) Projects for improving agricultural practices and introducing new techniques in animal husbandry, providing desks and chairs for schools, distributing educational materials, and conducting a general community development program are also under way.

3. (U) Other Organizations and Programs (U)

(U) The time available to the author did not allow a thorough investigation of the following organizations and programs as they exist in the southern provinces of Thailand. However, certain data were obtained and have been included with explanations.

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a. (U) Department of Local Administration (DOLA) (U)

(U) Information on DOLA acquired in discussions with provincial governors indicated that the organization and mission of DOLA was as described in the RACFO-T study, "Counterinsurgency Systems and Programs, Northeast Thailand."

b. (U) Rice Control (U)

(U) A rice control program does exist in some areas in southern Thailand. The avowed purpose is to prevent rice from falling into the hands of the CTO. A superficial investigation of the success of the program indicated that the program was not successful and that the CTO not only had no trouble in obtaining rice, but also that the program caused some hardship on the legal consumers. The administration of the program was lax, and rice ration cards were easily obtained.

(U) The program has been instituted in Betong, Bannang Sata, Waeng, and Yaha. The ration varies from 12 kilos/adult/month in Waeng, to 20 kilos/adult/month in Betong and Bannang Sata. The children's ration was 7.50 kilos/month. Individuals living in the area indicated that the rice distributed since the establishment of this program is higher priced and of poorer quality than before, even though the government has established price controls.

c. (U) Identification Cards (U)

(U) Each person in Thailand is required to be registered and keep in his possession a valid identification card or other form of legal identification that indicates the holder's status and reason for residing in the area. Identification cards must be renewed every five years at the office of original issue. This requirement works an extreme hardship on the individual and usually results in the failure of the registered

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person to renew his card. In general, it might be said that the program is not a success; the only time the card is required is when the person concerned is arrested or wants to conduct some form of legal transaction at a government office. The rural population, in general, avoids contact with government officials and on the whole does not comply with the identification card requirement. However, the CTO not only has its native born members obtain identification cards, but also requires them to keep them current.

d. ~~(U)~~ Resources Control (U)

~~(U)~~ A resources control program does not exist in southern Thailand, and information obtained from security force personnel indicates that there is no law under which such a program could be conducted. However, an extralegal resources control program was conducted by the BPP in the Betong area during a combined Thai-Malaysian operation. The BPP established check points at key road junctions and confiscated food, medicines, etc., in what they judged to be in excess of the individual or village requirements. This effort was shortlived due mainly to lack of personnel.

e. ~~(U)~~ Communist Suppression Committees (CSC) (U)

~~(U)~~ The Communist Suppression Committees that exist at the provincial level in southern Thailand are restricted in their operations by insufficient budget and lack of trained personnel to conduct operations. Also, the southern provinces are under the control of the National Security Command (NSC) rather than the Communist Suppression Operations Center (CSOC) in Bangkok. The CSC in each province is to coordinate its activities, when such activities exist, with the Regional Border Committee Office. The main function of the CSC is to collect intelligence within

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the province and forward the data to the RBCO, the Joint Suppression Center-8 at Nakorn Sri Thammarat and CSOC.

B. ^(U)~~(U)~~ Police and Paramilitary Organizations and Programs (U)

1. (U) Provincial Police (PP) (U)

(U) The organization, programs, and activities of the Provincial Police are contained in the RACFO-T version of the "Counterinsurgency Organizations and Programs in Northeast Thailand (U)."

(U) The Provincial Police Region 9 includes the five southern provinces. The headquarters of PP Region 9 is located in Songkhla, Amphur Muang, Songkhla Province.

(U) The PP in Region 9 have as their basic mission the suppression of crime and the maintenance of public safety. Any counterinsurgency role that might be attributed to the PP is rather nebulous. However, the PP Region 9 is commanded by a Police Major-General who is also a member of the Regional Border Committee and a codirector of the Regional Border Committee Office. In the latter two positions, the commanding general of the 9th Region has a definite role in counterinsurgency. Further, though the Separatist movement is not overtly active at this time, the PP do maintain surveillance of the movement.

(U) Under the crime suppression mission, the PP have special units trained to find and either capture or destroy the organized bandit gangs in the Pattani area and adjacent provinces.

(U) There have been only a few isolated incidents where PP officers were present during arrests or contacts with members of the Communist Terrorist Organization. The PP does not, as a general rule, participate in counter-CTO operations.

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2. ~~(S)~~ Special Branch Division (SPD), Criminal Investigation Bureau (U)

(U) The regional office of the Special Branch Division of the five southern provinces is located at the same place as the headquarters of PP Region 9 in Songkhla. The mission of the SPD in south Thailand is to gather information on all organizations and/or individuals that pose a threat to national security.

(U) ~~(S)~~ In south Thailand, the SPD furnishes information copies of all its reports to the RBCO for inclusion in its data files. In addition, the Chief of SPD in the area is also a member of the RBCO staff.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Though very little data is available, it should be noted that the majority of the Malaysian RBCO staff members are officers of the Special Branch Division, Royal Malaysian Police, and have been working in close cooperation with the Thai SPD for a number of years.

3. ~~(S)~~ Border Patrol Police (U)

(U) The history and overall organization of the BPP is contained in the RACFO-T version of the "Counterinsurgency Organizations and Programs on Northeast Thailand." This section will only consider the 9th Area BPP operational sector.

a. (U) Mission (U)

(U) The BPP in south Thailand conform to the general BPP mission. During peacetime, they perform general police functions and maintain public safety. Their specific duties include the following:

- Patrol the border of the whole country; prevent infiltration.
- Collect information for the security of the country.
- Support and render assistance to people in remote areas according to the national plan of remote area development.

(U)

- Operate air rescue service.
- Cooperate with the regular forces.
- Cooperate with local officials against Communism.

Special duties of the BPP include the following:

- Cooperate with local officials to prevent and suppress smuggling.
- Cooperate with local officials to prevent and suppress illegal immigration.
- Cooperate with local officials to suppress crime.
- Cooperate with local officials in special duties.
- Cooperate with local officials to assist the people in case of civil disturbance or disaster.

(U) In wartime the BPP are directed to operate under military control.

(U) This report will cover those activities directly related to the problem of counterinsurgency and the BPP operations conducted during the last year in the area of interest.

b. (U) 9th Area BPP Area of Operations (U)

(U) The headquarters of the 9th Area BPP is located in Songkhla, Amphur Muang, Songkhla Province. The area of responsibility includes the province of Songkhla, Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, and Satun. At present, the BPP is concentrating on countering the CTO. CTO activities are mainly concentrated in parts of Songkhla, Yala, and Narathiwat Provinces. The BPP, at this time, does not deploy personnel in either Satul or Pattani.


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Organization and Strength (U)

The 9th Area BPP is organized into a headquarters at Songkhla, 1st Company at Sadao, 2nd Company at Nathawi, 3rd Company at Betong and a number of independent platoons that report directly to the headquarters in Songkhla. See Figure 17. The number of platoons assigned to a company will vary and platoons are moved from company to company or to independent status on a rather random schedule.



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FIGURE 17 ORGANIZATION OF 9TH AREA BORDER POLICE (U)

(U) ✓

The present authorized strength of the 9th Area BPP is 30 platoons of 30 men each. However, most of the platoons are understaffed, and the area as a whole is suffering from a severe shortage of junior and senior officers. Most of the platoons are commanded by non-commissioned rather than commissioned officers and even at the area headquarters, there is a severe shortage of senior officers.

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(U) ✓ d. (U) ✓ Area 9 BPP Counterinsurgency Activities (1967) (U)

(U) ✓ The following breakdown of activities for 1967 indicate the counterinsurgency activities conducted by the BPP in Area 9. These activities are in addition to normal mission border patrol operations.

(U) ✓ (1) (U) ✓ Operations Conducted (U)

(U) ✓ The largest operation in 1967 was launched in the Betong Salient on June 7 and was called Operation Sawasdee. The purpose of this operation was to harass the CT and to deny them food and other supplies by setting up check points and conducting random patrols and ambushes. The operation will continue indefinitely. Operation Sawasdee is a joint Thai-Malaysian operation.

(U) ✓ On August 12, 1967, the LPP initiated a small Pocket Operation in the Yaha area with the purpose of disrupting CT activities in the area and preventing the CT from establishing camps. There were three contacts on September 10 as a result of this operation.

(U) ✓ Operation Salam started on November 7, 1967, and is being conducted in the Banto area. This is a joint Thai BPP/Malaysian Police Field Forces effort.

(U) ✓ (2) (U) ✓ BPP Psywar/Medical Team (U)

(U) ✓ The BPP Psywar/Medical Team in the 9th Area BPP area of operation has been concentrating mainly in the area covered by Operation Sawasdee and Operation Salam.

(U) ✓ The team itself did not start intensive field operations until late July 1967. Before that time, the team was operating from the area headquarters at Songkhla and showing films at local wa's (Buddhist places of worship) during religious or national holidays.

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(U)

The following data are presented to illustrate the activities of the team:

- December 16 and 12 Psywar/Medical Team gave medical aid to the residents of Banto; 45 persons were treated.
- November 7-29 The Psywar/Medical Team visited various areas in the Betong District and Banang Sata District. Special emphasis was placed on the area around Macward Village, Banto, in presenting anti-Communist films to the general public. There was good response from the public and some of the attendees were given medical treatment and advice. During this time period the medical personnel concentrated their efforts in the Banto area.

(U)

Table 7 is a list of film showings and other activities that was extracted from various documents and is believed to be a complete list of the activities of the Psywar/Medical team from July to November 1967.

(U) (3)

Arrests (U)

(U)

One hundred eight suspected CT supporters, CT sympathizers, or CT or MCYL members were arrested during the period of July to November 1967. Some of those arrested had no identification or expired

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Table 7.

(U) (C) ACTIVITIES OF THE DPP PSYWAR MEDICAL TEAM IN THE 9TH AREA (U)
(July to November 1967)

July 25 Ban To, Maeward, Bannang Sata.

July 26 School at Kilo 18., Tanah Merah Village, Betong; 150 attended; four received advice and 35 medical treatment.

July 27 Ayer Weng Village (QY 9832); about 200 persons attended.

July 28 Tanah Merah Village (QY 9710); about 200 persons attended.

August 2 Presentation of a shadow play at company headquarters, Betong.

August 3-8 Ban Chantarat, Betong
Ayer Berchang, Betong
Ramong School, Betong
Patae Tunggah School, Betong
Ban Charoh Petai, Betong
These shows were well attended and quite a number of villagers received medical aid.

August 12-13 MK 1 (QY 8723) Tanah Merah Village; 500 persons attended; 10 were given advice; 30 received medical attention.
Kapaek Hulu (QY 8418), Betong; 300 persons attended. Advice and medical treatment were given to some villagers.

August 19-25 Yarom Village (QY 9613), Betong; 250 attended.
Ban To Market (QZ 0547) Mae Wad Village, Bannang Sata; 400 attended.
Ban Kilo 9, MK 3, Tanah Merah Village, Betong; 150 attended.

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(U)

Table 7 (continued)

August 22 Four people given medical aid at headquarters
9th Region, Songkhla.

August 26 Patae Tiengae School, MK 2, Yarom. Film show;
seven villagers given advice; 25 given medical
treatment.

September 2-8 Datae Tungar School, Yarom, Betong
Kongsi 4, Tan Wee Lim (QY 8516), Betong
Ban Charoh Susu School (QY 9409), Betong
Kilo 18 School, Tanah Meray (QY 9427), Betong
Kapac Kortor School (QY 8813), Betong
Ban Ayer Weng School (QZ 0032), Weng

September 6 Ban Kunung Chanong School (QY 8516) MK 5, Betong

September 7 Ban Ramong School (QY 9212), Yarom Village, Betong

September 11 Ban Kilo 4, MK 1 (QY 8619), Tanah Merah Village,
Betong

September 12 Ban Cafe, MK 6, (QY 8614), Betong

September 13 Ban Kilo 7, MK 4, Tana Merah Village (QY 9019,
Betong

September 15 Ban Kilo 9, Tana Merah Village (QY 9719), Betong

September 16 Ban Kilo 27, Ayer Weng (QY 0133), Betong

September 19 Wat Buddhathivas (QY 8514), Betong

September 21 Ayer Berjang School, Mukim 9, Yarom Village
(QY 9109), Betong

September 22 Mukim 6, Yarom Village (QY 9715), Betong

October 2 Ban To (QZ 0547) Banang Sata; 300 attended.

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Table 7 (concluded)

October 3	Ban Mala Temple, MK 3, Tanah Merah (QY 9818), 500 ⁺ attended.
October 4	Ban Mala, Tambol Tanah Merah (QY 9818); about 400 attended.
October 6	Ban Bar Nam Ron, Tambol Tanah Merah; about 200 attended.
October 18	Kilo 18, Tanah Merah Village (QY 9426), Betong
October 20	Ban Kunung Chanong, MU 5 (QY 8516), Betong
October 21	Bar Kapai Kulu School (QY 8113, Betong
November 2	Kilo 11, Betong/Yala Road, Police check point (QY 9322); approximately 100 people attended.
November 5	Sannak Song Area, MU 1, Ayer Weng Village, Weng (QZ 0032); approximately 125 people attended.
November 8	Ban Bar Nam Ron School, Tanah Merah Village (QY 8723), Betong
November 9	Buddhathivas Wat, Betong Town, Betong
November 10	Berchong School, MU 9, Yarom Village (QY 9107), Betong.
November 11	Ban Sapan Chang Tai Area (QY 9715), Yarom Village, Betong.
November 11	MU 1, Tanok Merah Village (QY 8319), Betong
November 13	MU 4, Sannaksong Chanda, Pracha Ram, Betong

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documents in their possession. The following tabulation gives some information about those arrested:

Reason for Arrest	
• Suspected supporter of CT	94
• Suspected member of CT or MCYL	6
• No identification	5
• False or expired identification	3
Ethnic Group	
• Chinese	74
• Thai	1
• Thai/Muslim	11
• Unknown	22
Sex of Those Arrested	
• Male	84
• Female	24

(U)
(S) (4) Contacts, Camps, and Recovered Items (U)

(U) (S) A number of contacts with CT forces occurred during 1967, and four CT were killed. Data on these contacts are given in Table 8. In addition, a number of CT camps, permanent or temporary, were located by the BPP during this time period. Data on the camps that were located are given in Table 9. A number of supply caches were also located. Data on the items recovered are given in Table 10.

(5) (U) BPP - Remote Village Schools (U)

(U) There are a number of areas in south Thailand that are far from the normal commercial and civil areas. These areas are

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Table 8

(u) SECURITY FORCE/CT CONTACTS, 1967 (C)

Location	Coordinates	No. of CT	Casualties		Length of Contact	Date	Remarks
			Security Force	CT			
1. Kilo 18, Betong/ Yala Road	QY 925287	17	--	1 NIA	15 min.	0630 hrs 7 Dec 67	Recovered 1 Sten gun, ammo, tape recorder, tape, and 5 other items
2. Tay Mountain, Sadao	QT 072209	3	--	--	10 min	0620 hrs 21 Nov 67	Medicine, photo equip, electronics parts, etc.
3. Yarow, Betong	QY 999092	10	--	1 WIA* (escaped)	15 min	1315 hrs 10 Nov 67	
4. Banto	QZ 10K384	Unknown	--	WIA (escaped)	15 min	1014 hrs 9 Nov 67	
5. Kalok Village, Weng District	QZ 779289	~30	--	WIA (escaped)	2 hrs, 30 min	0540 hrs 28 Oct 67	Camp
6. Samnak Teaw, Sadao District	QS 06515R	5	--	1 NIA (escaped)	15 min	1230 hrs 29 Oct 67	
7. Ban Yee Rai	QY 827166	17	--	1 NIA (escaped)	50 min	1130 hrs 7 Oct 67	2 Female CT
8. Rambong	QY 989126	15	10 Thai 10 Malay	3 Thai WIA (escaped)	30 min	1115 hrs 7 Oct 67	

* Entry "WIA (escaped)" indicates that blood trails were found and indications were that one or more CT were wounded.

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Table M (continued)

Location	Coordinates	No. of CT	Security Force	Casualties		Length of Contact	Date	Remarks
				Security Force	CT			
9. Ban Yeh, Yaha District	QY 781872	7	1 Squad Thai	--	WIA (escaped)	1030 hrs 21 Sep 67		
10. Yaha District	QY 701812	10	2 Squads Thai	--	WIA (escaped)	1135 hrs 10 Sep 67		
11. Yaha District	QY 7482	20	52 Thai	1 MIA 3 WIA	1 or more WIA (escaped)	1220 hrs 10 Sep 67	This was a running fire-fight. The KIA was the police LT in charge.	
12. Off the Betong/Yala Road	QY 923167	7	Patrol Thai	--	WIA (escaped)	11 Jul 67	In a house.	
13.	QZ 001132	2	Patrol Thai/Malay	--	--	9 Jul 67	100 unarmed Chinese with packs fled at the sight of patrol.	
14. Ban Trok Kuehlin Khao Mk 5, Tanah Merah Village, Betong	QY 899228	20/30	Patrol Thai	--	WIA (escaped)	5 Jul 67		
15. Tanah Merah Betong	QY 921249	6	Patrol Thai	--	2 KIA 4 WIA (escaped)	0430 hrs 6 May 67	CT resting place, many pairs of boots recovered.	
16. Weng, Narathi-wat	QZ 753265	Unknown	30-Thai	2 WIA	WIA (escaped)	1230 hrs 20 Mar 67	A large camp. RPP held CT vill reinforcements arrived, but CT destroyed camp and infiltrated the RPP lines.	

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Table 4 (concluded)

Location	Coordinates	No. of CT	Security Force	Casualties		Length of Contact	Date	Remarks
				Security Force	CT			
17. Betong	QY 890285	4	Platoon Thai	--	1 KIA	15 min	1330 hrs 16 Mar 67	CT made three attempts to recover body.
18. Samnak Tree Village, Sadoo District	QT 0415	Unknown	Patrol Thai	--	WIA (escaped)	15 min	15 Mar 67	Follow up to finding the abandoned resting places.
19. Ban Kuan Pla	QT 182195	6-8	Patrol Thai	--	WIA (escaped)	20 min	1145 hrs 25 Feb 67	
20. Weng District	QZ 792299	7	Patrol Thai	--	WIA (escaped)	10 min	1115 hrs 29 Jan 67	
21. K. Perah MK6 Weng District	QZ 804291	Unknown	Patrol Thai	--	--	--	2030 hrs 21 Jan 67	
22. Betong District	QY 8222	Unknown	Platoon Thai	--	--	45 min	0945 hrs 21 Jan 67	Follow up revealed a large CT Camp.
23. Kongsi 4, Frik Area	QT 172276	4	Patrol Thai	--	WIA (escaped)	45 min	0610 hrs 19 Jan 67	
24. Yarrum Area	QS 9916	7	Patrol Thai	--	WIA (escaped)	15 min	10 Jan 67	

* This camp was reported in SRI Report TN-4933-26.
 Note: Except for entry 13, all contacts involved an exchange of fire.

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(U) Table 9
OT CAPS DISCOVERED, 1967 (1)

Location	Coordinates	Under- ground	Classification				Fortifications			Date Discovered	Additional Data		
			Perm.	Temp.	Blair	Rest.	Cup	Path	Trenches			Bunkers	
Betong Area	QY 812222	X	X							12	04	5 Jan	1 err. pits 3 years old
Yarom Area	QS 993165	X	X							4	7	10 Jan	follow-up of contact
Kongai I, Prik Area	QT 172276	X	X							5	8	15 Jan	Follow-up of contact 5 apply dumps discovered
Betong District	QY 812222	X	X					X	X	42	20	21 Jan	Training camp, err 1000 22 in Table 4
Ban Kuan Plo	QT 182195	X	X		X					3	8	15 Feb	Follow-up after contact
Weng District	QZ 784295	X								1	1	5 Mar	
Weng District	QZ 783294	X										5 Mar	
Weng District	QZ 780295	X	X							8	50	10 Mar	
Sannah Taw, Sadao	QT 0115	X			X					15	15	14 Mar	No separate sites in very close proximity 24,000 sq. meters 60 punji pits
Kayuhala, Weng	QZ 761240	X	X					X	X	21	30	23 Mar	
Kuan Yong Area, Sadao	QT 090130	X			X					7	7	27 Apr	
Tanah Merah, Betong	QY 924219	X			X					6	6	6 May	
Ban Kuan Hai Koo, Ban Prik, Sadao	QT 160260	X										20 May	
a.		X			X				3	15	15		420 sq. ft
b.		X			X					10	10		350 sq. ft--80 ft north of a
c.		X			X					10	10		360 sq. ft--150 ft north of b.
Chantarat Area, Betong	QZ 001228	X								5	15	8 June	
Yarom, Betong	QY 993071	X							2	4	40	10 June	
Prik, Sadao	QT 164266	X							1	15	15	12 June	
Yarom, Betong	QY 957135	X								4	50	12 June	Plastic roofs

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Table 9 (continued)

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Location	Coordinates	Unoc- cupied	Classification				Fortifications			Capac- ity	Date Dis- covered	Additional notes
			Perms.	Temp.	Place	Ink.	Gun	Pits	Trenches			
Betong	QY 996122	X			X					40	16 June	Supply point and weapons training site.
Tanah Merah, Betong	QY 9324	X			X					350	26 June	Natural cave.
Betong	QY 855180	X				X				30	27 June	Two months old.
Betong	QY 937075	X					X	4		100	27 June	
Tanah Merah, Betong	QY 893205	X									5 July	Wire alarm system.
Prik Village	QT 176283	4							2	10	7 July	40 sq. meters, one month old.
Sumah Teau	QY 22091									15	8 July	1 week old.
	QY 899067	X				X			1	20	8 July	Probable CT classroom, 1 year old.
Yarom, Betong	QT 1-2187	X								10	10 July	
	QY 996123	X					X		5	25	11 July	40 sq. meters, 2 years old.
Yarom, Betong	QY 996133	X					X			13	14 July	
Yarom, Betong	QY 952055	X						4	1	150	17 July	1,500 sq. meters, 1 year old.
Veng Village, Betong	QY 926327	X							2	100	17 July	6 panji pits, canvas roofs, 6 months old.
Veng Village, Betong	QY 926314	X								100	17 Jul	5,000 sq. meters, 10 panji pits.
Sumah Teau, Sadao	QY 065233	X								15	22 July	600 sq. meters.
Tanah Merah, Betong	QY 845217	X							3	150	27 July	6,000 sq. meters, 5 panji pits, 4 years old.
Yarom, Betong	QY 994142	X								20	28 July	90 sq. meters, 1 year old.
Ban Yee Rai	QY 833191	X								10	29 July	Deserted 5 min before discovery.
Pruiter Village	QT 015135	X								7	29 July	70 sq. meters, 1 month old.

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Table 9 (continued)

Location	Coordinates	Iron - cupied	Iron - occu- pied	Classification			Fortifications			Bligs.	Popu- lity	Date covered	Additional notes	
				Perm.	Temp.	Rest.	Pits	franchis	Posts					Sentry
Top of a hill.	QY 895302	X	X	X		X				3	20	7 Aug		
In the jungle	QY 002111	X	X	X		X				1	7	9 Aug	Zinc Roof on bar	
Yaha District	Q1 805403	X	X	X		X				10	10	10 Aug	1 month old	
Kabang, Jaha District.	QZ 0209	X	X	X		X				1	8	30 Aug	3 months old	
		X	X	X		X						11 Sept		
Tanah Merah, Betong	QY 985244	X	X	X		X				7	60	13 Sept	7,700 sq meters, 8 years old	
Tanah Merah, Betong	QY 95256	X	X	X		X				1	1	13 Sept	12 sq meters, plastic roofs on shelters	
Tanah Merah, Betong	Q1 923163	X	X	X		X				30	10	10 Sept	30 sq meters	
Khas Charah Jo, Kabang		X	X	X		X				20	25	25 Sept		
Ban Birmaleh, Golok Bong	QZ 786230	X	X	X		X				4	60	4 Oct	1,000 sq meters, 2 years old	
Yarom, Betong	QY 9017	X	X	X		X					6	13 Oct		
Tanah Merah, Betong	QY 8923	X	X	X		X					15	16 Oct	2-9 sq meters	
Ban Nava, Samah Teau, Saliu	Q5 883181	X	X	X		X			3		50	21 Oct	120 sq meters, 1 year old	
Suan Iung Ga Loo, Betong	QY 852111	X	X	X		X					70	27 Oct		
Ban Raulung, Yarom	QY 979118	X	X	X		X			4	3	100	27 Oct	8,000 sq meters, 8 days old	
Kalok Village, Benc	QZ 779289	X	X	X		X					12	30	28 Oct	
Ayer Bng, Betong	QZ 109293	X	X	X		X					20	30 Nov	300 sq meters, 4 years old	
Yarom Village, Betong	QY 90092	X	X	X		X					10	10 Nov		
Bunbung Hai, Pruh Nu Village, Nathai	QT 276228	X	X	X		X			1		70	14 Nov	22,000 sq meters, 12-15 years old	

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Table 10

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ITEMS RECOVERED FROM CT SUPPLY CAMPS, 1967 (U)

Clothing, civilian and military

Cooking utensils

Foodstuff, preserved and fresh

Electronic equipment

- Radios and radio parts
- Tape recorders and recording tape
- Power supplies
 - Battery
 - Gasoline powered generators

Weapons

- Automatic weapons
- Rifles and rifle parts
- Handguns and parts
- Grenades
- Detonators and fuzes
- Ammunition and loading equipment

Building Supplies

- Zinc sheets
- Plastic sheets
- Rope
- Nails

Medical Supplies

- Medicine
- Bandages
- Equipment

Documents

- Books
- Propaganda leaflets
- Documents (locally published)
- Newspapers
- Operational orders and diaries
- Letters, official and personal

Miscellaneous

- Bottles and plastic bags
- Mosquito nets
- Booby traps and spike boards
- Furniture

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thinly populated, and the few villages do not receive attention from civil authorities. The children of these villages could not attend school because the existing schools were too distant and no local funds are available for building local schools. The BPP has established a number of schools in these remote areas. The schools are built and maintained by the BPP, which also provides the teachers.

(U) In Area 9, BPP, there are presently 16 schools sponsored under this plan by the BPP. Three are located in Narathivas Province, five in Yala Province, and eight in Songkhla Province.

4. (U) Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC) (U)

(U) Investigation of the Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC) indicates that the program has been relatively inactive in the southern provinces for several years, due mainly to a shortage of funds. Even in those provinces where the existence of VDC organizations is claimed, this existence is mainly on paper only; the VDC members are unpaid and poorly armed. They serve primarily as intelligence agents in the villages where they reside.

5. (U) Customs and Immigration Services (U)

a. (U) Department of Customs, Ministry of Finance (U)

(U) The five southern provinces of Thailand are in Region 1 of the four customs regions. There are 16 customs stations in this region, and they are all located at ports of entry and at various strategic locations within the region. The Customs Department personnel have authority to search all vehicles and vessels at ports of entry and seize contraband or undeclared items on which duty is required.

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(U) Region 1 is authorized to keep a staff of 238, constituted as follows:

- 1 Special Grade Officer
- 7 First Grade Officers
- 10 Second Grade Officers
- 31 Third Grade Officers
- 167 Fourth Grade Officers
- 20 Permanent Exempt
- 2 Unclassified

(U) The customs personnel do not, as a general rule, patrol borders. The BPP act for the customs department in cases of smuggling on the Thai/Malaysian border area.

(U) Customs authorities indicated that items smuggled were in the following categories.

1. Rice and other foodstuffs
2. Cigarettes
3. Alcoholic beverages
4. Automobiles
5. Special items: cameras, electronic equipment, etc.
6. General merchandise
7. Precious metals and stones
8. Drugs and medicines
9. Miscellaneous items

b. (U) Immigration Division, Police Department (U)

(U) The Immigration Division is under the jurisdiction of the Police Department. In the five southern provinces, the Immigration Division maintains immigration stations at all ports of entry. The duty of the immigration personnel is to check the passports or other travel

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documents of each person entering or leaving the country. Immigration Division personnel do not patrol borders. The BPP act for the Immigration Division in cases of illegal border crossing along the Thai/Malaysian Border.

b. (U) Police Field Force, Royal Malaysia Police (U)

(U) The Police Field Force (PFF) of the Royal Malaysian Police was organized in 1955 from 22 Jungle Companies (180 men each) then in existence. The PFF is composed of regular police officers of varying ranks who have received the special training and equipment required to conduct paramilitary duties.

(U) The PFF has been designed, trained, and equipped to:

- Seek out and destroy terrorists or criminals who attempt to operate from, or take refuge in, the jungle.
- Patrol the frontier and large tracts of sparsely occupied country to prevent illegal entry and to bring security to isolated communities.
- Assist district police in dealing with public order disturbances and routine or special duties.

(U) The PFF furnishes manpower to the operational arm of the Regional Border Committee Office in Songkhla. Under the present Border Agreement, the PFF will supply manpower, on a one to one ratio with the BPP, in support of joint border operations in southern Thailand. The PFF maintains an alert company at the former PFF Training Center in Kroh, Malaysia, only ten minutes by vehicle from the Thai/Malaysian Border.

(U) In addition to supplying manpower, the PFF also has a training program conducted at Ipoh, Malaysia, PFF Training Center, that is open to Thai police and military personnel. This course has been well attended and has made coordination of BPP and PFF operations much simpler.

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C. (U) Military (U)

1. (U) Royal Thai Air Force (U)

(U) At the present time there is no deployment of RTAF Forces in the five southern provinces of Thailand.

2. (U) Royal Thai Navy (U)

(U) The Royal Thai Navy is not currently deployed in the five southern provinces of Thailand.

(U) The Royal Thai Navy and the Royal Thai Government are presently constructing a navy base at Songkhla. Plans call for a deep water port facility.

3. (U) Royal Thai Army (U)


(U) The CI Systems Manual considers the following Royal Thai Army organizations operating in the five southern provinces of Thailand:

- Headquarters, 5th Regimental Combat Team located at Haadyai
- Battalion Combat Team, located at Pattani
- Special Operations Center 51, located at Pattani

a. (U) 5th Regimental Combat Team (U)

(U) The headquarters of the 5th Regimental Combat Team is located at Koh Hong Camp, approximately 5 kilometers from Haadyai Town, Songkhla Province. The 5th RCT is subordinate to the headquarters of the 5th Military Circle, located at Nakorn Sri Thammrat Town, Nakorn Sri Thammarat Province. The organization of the 5th Regimental Combat Team is shown in Figure 18.

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FIGURE 18 ORGANIZATION OF 5TH REGIMENT COMBAT TEAM (U)

(U) Each battalion has three infantry companies, except the battalion combat team at Pattani which has only two companies. The battalions at Chumphorn and Nakorn Sri Thammarat will not be covered in this report.

(1) (U) Battalion Combat Team (BCT) (U)

(U) The Battalion Combat Team is located at Camp Colonel Ingkayudhborihan, Pattani Province. The BCT has two infantry companies, a battery of 77-mm pack howitzers, and one cavalry troop equipped with twelve M-8 recon vehicles (rubber-tired).

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(2) (U) Support Units, Koh Hong Camp (U)

(U) The following support units are assigned to headquarters, 5th RCT, at Koh Hong Camp:

- 1 Medical Company
- 1 Heavy Mortar Company
- 1 Service Company
- 1 Engineering Company (Construction)
- 1 Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) Platoon equipped with 16-113s.

(3) (U) Special Operations Center 51 (U)

(U) The Special Operations Center (SOC) 51 is supported by the 5th RCT. Personnel and equipment are drawn from the 5th RCT. SOC 51 is covered later in this report.

(U) (U) ~~(S)~~ Mission (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ The mission of the 5th RCT is to defend south Thailand from external enemies. In other words, internal problems, i.e., insurgency, do not come under the jurisdiction of the 5th RCT.

(U) ~~(S)~~ Military operations in the south are classified as training missions and are not counterinsurgency operations. It should be noted, however, that three companies have received counterinsurgency training at the U.S. Special Forces Training Camp located at Trang. One company is kept on station between the towns of Trang and Phattalung with a mission of pacification and civic action.

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(5) (U) Songkhla Military District (U)

(U) The Songkhla Military District (SMD) is a support unit to the 5th RCT. The SMD is commanded by the commander of the 5th RCT. In actual practice, the Deputy Commander of the 5th RCT is responsible for SMD activities.

b. (U) Special Operations Center, 51 (U)

(U) The headquarters for SOC 51 is located at Camp Colonel Ingkayudhborihanr, QT 972365, Pattani Province.

(U) ✓ SOC 51 operates in three provinces in Pattani (8 amphurs), Yala (5 amphurs), and Narathiwat (9 amphurs). (See Figure 19.)

(U) ✓ The organization of SOC 51 is illustrated in Figure 20. The SOC is composed of five operational nine-man special operation teams (SOTs), a psychological operations Team, and a security platoon. The five authorized armoured squads of the security platoon are not assigned. There is one medical team with a medical officer at SOC Headquarters. Each SOT has two medics assigned.

(U) ✓ The communications network for SOC 51 is illustrated in Figure 21. The SOC has one AN/GRC-19 and six AN/VRC-34. Radio communication is maintained with 5th RCT Headquarters at Haadyai, 5th Military Circle Headquarters at Nakorn Sri-Thammarat, and RTA Headquarters in Bangkok.

(U) ✓ The operations and missions of the SOC are contained in the SOC Handbook. A translation of the handbook is available at the ARPA RDC-T Information Center.

(U) ✓ Briefly, the missions of the SOC are to:

1. Maintain an Operation Base for obtaining intelligence for the Army; obtain intelligence concerning various movements and check people that have infiltrated into Thailand in the area of operation.

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


FIGURE 19 AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY OF SOC 51 (PATTANI, YALA, AND NARATHIWAT) (C)

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


FIGURE 20 ORGANIZATION OF SOC 51 (C)

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


FIGURE 21 COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK FOR SOC 51 (C)

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2. Conduct civic action for the purpose of convincing the populace that the military is friendly, and obtaining the people's cooperation in conducting military operations.
3. Conduct public relations activities; distribute correct information about the operation of a democratic government to the people for the purpose of increasing their support of the administration and the King.
4. Counter any disorder; prevent the terrorists from creating any disorders by discovering their plans and preventing them from carrying them out.

(U) Operations plans are conceived by the SOC headquarters staff and are based on past experience, present operations, and known requirements in the area. The plan of operation is forwarded through the 5th RCT, 5th Military Circle, to RTA headquarters for approval or modification. All operations are conducted in accordance with the approved operational plans. The operations are coordinated with the District Officer in each amphur where SOC personnel will be operating. When specific problems arise or specific projects are under way, the SOC personnel will cooperate with the specific amphur officer involved, i.e., public health, agriculture, etc.

(U) The following list is a summary of operations for the entire SOC for five months:

- SOTs and the Psychological Operations Team visited 493 villages.
- The medical team treated 7,157 patients.
- Roads over 9,360 meters were built or repaired.
- Tools, clothes, books, etc. amounting to 2,598 items were distributed.
- Movies were shown 37 times.

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(U) IV COUNTERINSURGENCY-RELATED DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS (U)

A. (U) General (U)

(U) The government wants to raise the standard of living in the rural villages and to improve the local administration of government policies for the purpose of strengthening the nation's security. The primary target of the Government development programs is the rural village (see Figure 22), which is also the principal interface with the insurgent and the primary target of the CTO. The rural, frequently remote village, represents a source of supplies, recruits, and intelligence for the CTO and is the first and most vulnerable point of subversion, the base on which the insurgents build their organizations. To counteract the activities of the CTO, the government needs the support of the residents of these villages, but winning their allegiance is both time-consuming and costly. In addition, since the customs and beliefs of the villagers differ from those of the urban population, it is difficult to determine what action to take.


B. (U) Specific (U)

1. (U) Community Development (U)

(U) The Community Development Program is aimed at raising the standard of living at the village level through encouraging cooperation between villagers and the government in a variety of specific projects. These projects include construction and maintenance of village roads, construction of small dams for flood control and irrigation, and designing and building of water drainage systems, sanitary privies, and covered

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FIGURE 22 SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT'S DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (U)

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wells with hand water pumps. Agricultural projects include teaching villagers new methods of breeding and caring for livestock, providing better quality seeds so that villagers can obtain higher crop yields, introducing new types of crops, and teaching villagers improved methods of cultivating crops. In addition, fresh water fish farms have been started. Occupational training projects, such as teaching women pertinent handicraft arts, are also undertaken.

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(U) Some of the projects are conducted entirely by the various Government organizations; others are undertaken jointly by the villagers and the government, with the former supplying the labor and the latter providing materials, equipment, and technical assistance. Still others are carried out entirely by the villagers, with the government providing only technical advice. As a general rule, most projects that were completed as of 1966 were of the first two types, more of the second than the first.

(U) The Government organization that has the primary responsibility for the Program is the Department of Community Development, Ministry of Interior. The Community Development supervisors at the provincial and district levels and the village organizer (or Community Development officer assigned to work with all of the villages in a commune) are responsible for implementing the projects. The Community Development Center at Yala conducts special training programs for villagers. Its chief function, however, is to provide technical assistance to the village organizers.

(U) Community Development committees at the provincial, district, and village levels help the Community Development officials determine what projects are needed and what priority level these projects should have. The provincial and district committees consist of the Community Development supervisors (one for each Province and district), certain other provincial and district officials, and private citizens. A village committee consists of the village organizer, the village headman, and a few villagers.

(U) The border provinces are considered to be part of Community Development Region IX. Trang and Patthalung are also part of this region. As of August 1966, only four of these seven provinces had Community Development programs--Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat, and Satun. At that time, such

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programs were operating in only twelve districts in these provinces. Four additional districts, in the same four provinces, were expected to have programs within a few months.

(U) Before a Community Development program is established in a district, pilot projects are undertaken for the purpose of determining if the village is ready for a full-scale program. These pilot projects are designed by the Community Development Center in conjunction with the provincial supervisor. Normally, either the district health officer or the agricultural officer is charged with the implementation. Once the Center and the provincial supervisor determine that the establishment of a Community Development program in the district is desirable, a recommendation to this effect is submitted to officials in Bangkok. Such a program can be begun, however, only when sufficient funds and personnel are available. The latter, that is the district supervisor or village organizers, are partly drawn from districts with ongoing programs and partly from recent graduates of training courses run by the Center.

(U) The first thing a village organizer does in a commune that previously did not have an organizer assigned to it is to survey existing socioeconomic conditions in each village. This survey provides a baseline against which development progress can be measured. Next he draws up a list of projects needed in the next five years and, with the village committee, assigns priorities (considering competing needs, priorities submitted by other organizers, and the financing available). These priorities must be approved by the district and provincial supervisors and committees. Final decisions are made in Bangkok, and the approved projects are included in the five-year national development plan for Thailand, which covers all development, not just Community Development.

(U) As an example of Community Development programs in south Thailand, data on programs being conducted in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat

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are reviewed in the following pages. (The program in Satul is still in the formative stage, though much of the planning has been completed and submitted for review.)

a. (U) Community Development in Yala Province (U)

(U) In 1959 the Ministry of Interior opened the following two local areas as experimental development areas:

- Ban Yala development areas--Kube, Tambol Yala, Amphur Muang Yala
- Ban Larkor development area--Arsen, Tambol Yaha, Amphur Yaha

(U) In 1960, the Ministry of Interior opened the Ban Barlor experimental development area in Tambol Barlor, Amphur Raman. They also opened the following five experimental development areas in coordination with the project at Amphur Muang:

- Tambol Yala development area
- Tambol Natham development area
- Tambol Poh Seng development area
- Tambol Pron development area
- Tambol Thasarp development area

(U) In 1961, the Ministry of Interior opened the whole of Amphur Muang Yala by grouping the experimental development areas. This development was in accordance with the area enlargement project for Amphur Muang Yala, which had opened one area in 1960. The Amphur Muang Yala development area was subdivided into 18 groups with one development officer responsible for each group. Also, in 1961, the Ministry opened the following three village and experimental development areas of the type organized at Tambol:

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Tambol Wangpar development area, Amphur Raman

Tambol Tanoh Mae Roh development area, Amphur Betong

Ayer Weng development area, Amphur Betong

(U) In 1964, the Ministry opened the whole of Amphur Yaha and subdivided the amphur development area into six groups (one group per Tambol). In 1965, the amphur development area at Amphur Raman was started by subdividing the area into 15 groups. In 1966, the Ministry opened the amphur development area at amphur Bannang Star by subdividing the area into five groups.

b. (U) Community Development Operation in Pattani Province (U)

(1) (U) Opening of the Test Area

(U) Community Development operations in Changwat Pattani began in 1958 by opening test units in Tambol Magnood Amphur Khok-pho and Tambol Manungdalam Amphur Saiburi. The palad-amphur was in charge of the first groups training.

(U) By the end of 1959, six of the fourth Training group finished their course at the Adult Education Training Center in Ubolratchathani and were assigned to handle the project at Tambol Manungdalam Amphur Saiburi.

(U) In 1961, nine other test areas were formed in Amphur Khok-pho, Amphur Yarinr, and Amphur Nong-chik. Each area had one member of the fourth training group personnel in charge. The development Palad Amphur, in cooperation with five of the third training group, clerks to the Ministry of Interior, were assigned joint responsibility.

(U) Five villages were opened in test area Tambol Bo-thong Amphur Nong-chik in May 1965 and two more in July 1965.

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(U) Table 11 lists the 11 developmental test areas that have been opened in Pattani by date of establishment.

(2) (U) The Amphur Community Development Area

(U) The Amphur Community Development area in Amphur Khok-pho was opened in compliance with the declaration of the Ministry of Interior dated October 1962. The development area was divided into 10 groups, consisting of 10 Tambols and included 77 villages. Community Development workers were graduates of the Adult Education Training Center Ubolrachathani.

(U) The Amphur Community Development area in Amphur Yarang was opened in compliance with the declaration of the Ministry of Interior dated August 17, 1964. The development area was divided into 12 groups, consisting of 12 Tambols, and included 63 villages. Personnel from the last group of fourth class community development workers and two information personnel were in charge.

(U) The Amphur Community Development area in Amphur Saiburi was opened according to the declaration of the Ministry of Interior dated September 29, 1965. The development area was divided into 13 groups, consisting of 13 Tambols, and included 79 villages. Eleven members of the third and fourth training groups of fourth class community development workers were in charge.

(U) The Amphur Community Development area in Amphur Mayo was opened in accordance with the declaration of the Ministry of Interior dated August 9, 1966. The development area was divided into 15 groups, consisting of 17 Tambols, and included 63 villages. Fifteen of the fourth training class of community development workers graduated from the 9th region Community Development Center. One amphur community development worker was in charge of the area.

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Table 11

(U) DATA ON THE 11 DEVELOPMENT TEST AREAS IN PATTANI (U)

Year	Amphur	Tambol	Village	Officers in Charge
1958	Khok-pio	Makrood	Makrood	1st training group Palad Amphur
1958	Saiburi	Manungdalam	5 villages	1st training group Palad Amphur
1961	Khok-pio	Makrood	Nahkate	Training clerk for the Department of Interior
1961	Khok-pho	Makrood	Banrang	1st training group
1961	Nong-chik	Bo-thong	every village	1st training group
1961	Yarang	Kao-tumb	Ba-ngoyaha	Information personnel, 4th group
1961	Yarang	Kao-tumb	Sarong	Information personnel, 4th group
1961	Yarang	Memawc	Rongkrabuang	Training clerk for the Department of Interior, 1st group
1961	Yarang	Yarang	Tonturiam	Information personnel, 4th group
1961	Yarang	Sanoh	Sanoh	Information personnel, 4th group
1961	Yarang	Rawaeng	Rawaeng	Training Palad Amphoe, 3rd group

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(U) The Amphur Community Development area in Am Nong-chik was opened in response to the declaration of the Ministry of Interior dated November 4, 1966. The development area was divided into 12 groups, consisting of 12 Tambols, and included 60 villages. Twelve of the fourth training class of community development workers graduated from the 9th region Community Development Center were in charge.

(U) The Amphur Community Development area in Amphur Panare was opened according to the declaration of the Ministry of Interior dated November 4, 1966. The development area was divided into 10 groups consisting of 10 Tambols, and included 47 villages. Ten of the fourth training class of community development workers graduated from the 9th region Community Development Center were in charge.

(U) The Amphur Community Development area in Amphur Yaring was opened in 1967. Although the declaration from the Ministry of Interior had not been issued, the community development workers were in place and ready to start at that time. The development area was divided into 17 groups, consisting of 17 Tambols, and included 72 villages; 17 of the fourth training class of community development workers graduated from the 9th region Community Development Center are in charge.

(U) By early 1967, projects were begun in seven amphurs, including 89 Tambols and 647 villages.

c. (U) Community Development in Narathiwat Province (U)

(1) (U) Community Development in Amphur Ra-Ngae

(U) Amphur Ra-Ngae was opened to community development in 1960 and subdivided into 11 groups. The amphur includes 69 villages whose populations total 10,135. The total population of the amphur is 51,978--28,702 males and 23,276 females. Ninety-eight percent of the residents are Thai, and 1.2 percent are Chinese. Eighty-seven percent

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are Muslims, and 12.65 percent are Buddhists. There are 53 schools staffed by 200 instructors. These schools serve 7,758 students of which 4,211 are male and 3,547 are female. Most of the residents work on rubber plantations, rice farms, or orchards. A total of 568,750 rai* is employed approximately as follows:

Rice farms	32,000 rai
Rubber plantations	147,706 rai
Orchards	4,000 rai
Other farms	8,000 rai
Settlements	10,135 rai
Unoccupied	367,073 rai

(2) (U) Amphur Yingo Community Development Region

(U) Amphur Yingo was opened to development in 1964; it was subdivided into six groups. This amphur includes 30 villages with a total population of 3,991. The population of the entire amphur is 23,012--11,609 males and 11,403 females. Ninety-nine percent are Thai; 1 percent are Chinese. Five percent are Buddhists, and 95 percent are Muslims. There are 17 schools with 94 instructors, and 2,672 students--1,481 males and 1,191 females. Most of the residents work on rubber plantations, rice farms, or orchards. Plantations occupy 34,525 rai; settlements 14,800; rice farms 1,450; other farms 13,660; and 60,129 rai are unoccupied.

(3) (U) Amphur Ru So Community Development Region (U)

(U) Amphur Ru So opened to development in 1964; it was divided into seven groups. This amphur includes 45 villages whose populations total 4,887. The total population of the amphur is 33,985--16,960 males and 17,025 females. Ninety-five percent are Thai, and

* One rai = 1,600 square meters; 2.5 rai = about 1 acre.

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4 percent are Chinese. Nine percent are Buddhists; 90 percent are Muslims. There are 51 schools with 156 instructors and 4,727 students--2,502 males and 2,225 females. Most of the people are employed on rubber plantations, rice farms, or other kinds of plantations. The 662,250 rai of land are employed as follows:

Rice farms	12,946
Rubber plantations	221,248
Other plantations	68,365
Settlements	14,691
Unoccupied	345,000

(4) (U) Amphur Su-Ngai Kolok Community Development Region (U)

(U) Amphur Su-Ngai was opened to development in 1966 and divided into three groups. This amphur includes 12 villages. The total population of the amphur is 24,873--11,934 males and 12,939 females. Eighty-eight percent are Thai, and 10 percent are Chinese. Twelve percent are Buddhists, and 80 percent are Muslims. The number of schools is not available, but there are 4,794 students. Most of the people work on rubber plantations or rice farms, or are traders. Figures on the way the land is employed are unavailable.

(5) (U) Amphur Takbai Community Development Region (U)

(U) Amphur Takbai was opened to development in 1966 and was subdivided into seven groups. Thirty-eight villages with a total population of 5,841 were included. The total population of the amphur is 30,985--15,352 males and 15,633 females. This makes up 99.8% of the population; Chinese 0.13 percent. Thirty-three percent are Buddhist, and 67 percent are Muslims. There are 31 schools with 3,517 students. Principal occupations are rice-farming, fishing, trading, and working in orchards.

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6) (U) Amphur Su-Ngai Path Community Development Region IV

(U) Amphur Su-Ngai was opened to development in 1967; subdivided into six groups. This amphur includes 29 villages with a total population of 4,798. The total population of the amphur is 30,607-- 15,663 males and 14,944 females. Other statistics are not available.

2. (U) Malaria Eradication (U)

(U) The RACFO-T "Counterinsurgency Organization and Programs in Northeast Thailand" contains a summation of the Malaria Eradication Program. This report is only concerned with program activities in south Thailand.

(U) The five provinces under consideration in this manual are in Region IV. The Region IV headquarters are located in Songkhla Town, Songkhla Province. Data relating to daily operations is available at the Region IV headquarters.

(U) Though the Malaria Eradication Program is not usually considered a counterinsurgency effort, it does contribute to the overall counterinsurgency program in the following manner:

- a. The survey teams that travel through the target area make maps of towns and areas and take censuses.
- b. Both survey teams and spray teams spend time with villagers discussing the general situation and, in many cases, CT activity in the area.
- c. The mere presence of the malaria eradication personnel, performing their normal functions, indicates to the villagers that their government does consider their welfare and is providing services.

(U) The activities of the Region IV personnel during 1967 are indicated in Table 12.

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Table 12

(U) SCOPE OF MALARIA ERADICATION OPERATIONS FOR 1967 (U)
 (Regional Malaria Eradication Center--
 Five Southern Provinces)

Changwad	Population Reached by Spray in 1967	Population Reached by Surveillance Operations in 1967	Population not under Surveillance	Kilograms of DDT		Kilograms of DDT To Be Used, Two Cycles, 1967*		Number of Blood Slides in 1966†	Positive Cases in 1966 (Most were Given Additional Treatment)	Number of Malaria Drug Tablets Used in 1966‡
				Used, Two Cycles 1966	Used, Two Cycles, 1967*					
Yala	138,137	113,978	69,241	35,846						
Narathiwat	287,219	287,434	38,940	57,616			22,444	443		
Pattani	327,414	345,992	68,968				28,666	2,101		
Songkhla	536,519	529,833	83,916	125,318			45,154	2,450		
Satul	85,438	85,438		21,529						
Total	1,376,727	1,362,675	182,097	309,209	337,228*		96,266	4,994		715,000‡

* Estimated; subject to increase.

† Each donor was treated.

‡ Expected to exceed this number in 1967 by about 20 †.

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3. U Public Health U

a. (U) General

U Public Health program in Thailand now include disease control and sanitation projects and the establishment of midwiferies, health centers, and hospitals. The provincial health officer, who is always a doctor, coordinates, and in some cases supervises, these various projects. He delegates much of the actual supervision to the district health officer, who is either a doctor or sanitation officer (the latter in those districts that do not have a doctor) in each of the districts in the province. The district health officer, in turn, has little direct contact with villagers except those who live near the administrative center of the district. He may have under him one or two sanitation officers who are assigned to health centers in the administrative center and elsewhere in the district; one or two regular nurses in these health centers; and several midwives stationed in the communes. He may also exercise nominal supervision over the DDT spray teams while they are operating in his district. In a very few districts, there are also government hospitals with one or more doctors and several regular nurses, but these tend to operate more or less autonomously; they receive orders directly from Bangkok or from the chief doctor at the provincial hospital.

(U) There is one health center in every district, and in a few districts there are others located in heavily populated communes. The government is currently making an effort to build a few new centers and to convert two or three second-class health centers into first-class centers each year. Most of the centers are in the second-class category, so that this conversion process will take some time.

(U) A second-class center consists of a small building containing one or two cots for temporary use of patients receiving emergency treatment. Patients seldom stay overnight. A sanitation officer is in

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charge of this type of center. In addition to giving shots to villagers and trying to improve sanitation conditions in the area served by the center, he treats minor illnesses and injuries. In centers located in more remote areas or some distance from where a doctor is available, the sanitation officer may have to perform emergency operations, in spite of his lack of the proper training and equipment. He is usually assisted by one midwifery nurse, who is stationed at the center. First-class health centers, in contrast, are supposed to have as many as ten beds for accommodating emergency cases and a staff of at least one doctor, one regular nurse, and one midwifery nurse. In actual practice, many have less than ten beds and some have a doctor only nominally since the assigned doctor is on leave or detached duty.

(U) The government has also partially renovated one or two of the provincial hospitals and has added a few new buildings to existing hospital complexes. However, no new hospitals per se have recently been constructed, nor are there immediate plans for doing so. Thus, there is a serious shortage of beds and other hospital facilities. Consequently, only the most seriously ill are admitted to the hospitals. All patients are charged for room, food, and medical services. The amount of the fees are supposedly adjusted to the patient's ability to pay. Poor patients are permitted to pay by installment after leaving the hospital, and sometimes no effort is made to collect from those who are obviously very poor.

(U) During the last few years, especially the last three or four, the midwifery program has been established in the border provinces. Previously, there had been a few nurses trained particularly for midwifery work, but nearly all of them were stationed in the health centers or hospitals. Now an effort is being made to place a midwifery nurse in every commune. As of late 1966, there was a midwifery nurse in one-third to one-half of the communes in the border provinces.

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(U) Each midwifery nurse has a small building that serves both as her residence and as the midwifery center for the commune. The primary duty of the midwifery nurse is to deliver babies and instruct mothers and local midwives on prenatal and postnatal care. She is authorized to charge a minimal fee for delivering babies and for any medicines she might give to villagers. Increasingly, the villagers are asking midwifery nurses to treat minor injuries and illnesses. Some nurses will treat patients or deliver babies only in their centers. Others will do so in homes in the village where the center is located. And still others will do so in other villages of the commune. The extent to which a nurse is willing to make calls in other villages is determined by the distance and condition of the road or path, the willingness of the village headman or some other responsible man to accompany her to the other village, and the availability of an interpreter in the other village. Most midwifery nurses speak only Thai and the Thai-Islam villagers speak Malay.

b. (U) Southern Public Health Development Center (U)

(U) In addition to the general health program in the south of Thailand, a Southern Public Health Development Center (SPHDC) was established at Songkhla, Amphur Muang, Songkhla Province in 1961. The SPHDC is attached to the Rural Public Health Development Project under the jurisdiction of the Department of Health.

(1) (U) SPHDC Objectives (U)

(U) The objectives of the SPHDC are to provide:

- Assistance in developing techniques and equipment (research and testing) suitable for specific rural conditions
- Evaluation of the techniques and equipment after their introduction to the rural areas.

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(2) (U) SPHDC Area of Responsibility (U)

(U) The 11 southern provinces are within the area of responsibility of the SPHDC. They are as follows:

Chumphon	Trang
Ranong	Phattalung
Burathani	Songkhla
Fungna	Satun
Krabi	Pattani
Phuket	Yala
Nakorn Sri Thamarat	Narathiwat

This report will only consider the SPHDC operations in the five southern provinces.

(3) (U) Technical Assistance (U)

(U) The SPHDC will provide the following technical assistance:

- Initial and refresher training for second and fourth class sanitary workers and Amphur Public Health Officers
- Testing of the potability of village water supplies and estimating the cost of a water supply system for the village. The estimate is submitted to the provincial authorities for future budgeting.
- Technicians, provided with the proper equipment, who will be dispatched to the rural areas to give training to local leaders.

(4) (U) Equipment Assistance (U)

(U) A great deal of equipment is available from the SPHDC for construction of water supply systems and sanitary toilets and wells. Movie projectors for film shows concerning public health are also available.

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5. (U) Research and Testing (U)

(U) The SPHDC has the capability to solve specific local problems. In some villages there may be a need for a specific type of water supply system or, there may be a specific sanitation problem that cannot be solved by the local officials. These problems will be taken on by the SPHDC, and special techniques or equipment will be developed.

6. (U) Program Evaluation (U)

(U) Officers of the SPHDC, in cooperation with provincial public health officers, conduct a continuing evaluation of all the provincial public health programs. These evaluations are analyzed and recommendations are made for future programs in each province.

4. (U) Rural Education (U)

(U) The education programs in south Thailand related to counter-insurgency efforts are conducted by the BPP and Mobile Development Units and are under the auspices of the Community Development Program.

(U) However the general rural education development conducted by the provinces should be mentioned. The general development in Yala Province, for example, is typical of the programs developed by each of the southern provinces and especially points out the problem of the conversion of the Islamic schools to meet government standards.

a. (U) History of Education of Yala Province (U)

(U) The history of education of various countries is greatly influenced by religion. The history of Thailand has been influenced by the teachings of Buddha and Brahmin. Because Buddha wrote in the Hindi language, some words in the Thai language are obviously derived from Hindi. On the other hand, the Koran of Islam is written in Arabic.

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Most of the people of Yala Province are Islamic and speak Malay. Consequently, their culture differs markedly from that of other Thais. Most of the inhabitants of Yala do not speak Thai at all.

(U) Accordingly, the Royal Thai Government assigned officials who spoke Malay well to conduct governmental affairs in Yala Province. These officials came from the Central Administrative Headquarters and were to be succeeded by their offspring. Education in Yala Province was under the jurisdiction of the Divisional Moral Section of Pattani Province. Since Yala Province had no Provincial Moral Officer, Sad Sukahud was appointed Rong Anmart Tri, a civilian office, and charged with establishing a school in Yala Province in 1909. This first school was located at Ban Li Mud, Tambon Thasarp. First through third grade classes were taught to approximately 60 male students. At first, there was only one teacher. Then, the Pattani Divisional Moral Officer sent two more teachers, including Rong Anmart Tri Sad Sukahud, who was to be the headmaster. Later, Luang Kuru Netipisit was appointed the first Yala Provincial Moral Officer. Thai Buddhists advocated the education of girls, and Muslims did not.

(U) Classes were conducted in wats (temples) and mosques. There were many wats, but there was little evidence that most wats were conducting any classes other than those for prospective priests. Muslims, however, were conducting classes in the Koran at the mosques; they did not teach in the Thai language. Although the official language was Malay, the Thai government was encouraging Muslim children to enter schools where they would be taught in Thai. In 1915, committees were formed at various Tambons to aid in the administration of all educational endeavors, including the classes held at mosques. A survey indicated that only 3 percent of the students attended any school. In 1920, the High Commissioner of Pattani Division recommended to the Minister of the Moral Department that compulsory learning be established. The Muslims did not favor

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education, and Muslim girls were kept sequestered. As a result of the High Commissioner's report, the government issued elementary education regulations, which would go into effect the following year.

(U) Some funds for education were given by private donors. Some districts raised funds to purchase school equipment by charging admission for dramatic shows in which the children performed. The free education funds were used as salaries for teachers and for some of the cost of construction of school buildings. Funding was far from sufficient, however. From 1909 to 1932, the Pattani Divisional Moral Officer, Phya Phiboon Phitayapak (Thong Kuptasa), had recommended to the Pattani High Commissioner that the construction of schools in the wilderness be postponed in favor of the construction of agricultural schools in Yala Province. The largest amount of land purchased for this purpose, on which the present government buildings are located, was an area of more than 2,000 rai.

(U) After the elementary education regulations were issued, schools were established in many Tambons. Each Tambon had one school. Children graduating from the highest class were given an opportunity to continue their education in the elementary agricultural school, which was set up in 1934. This school was the first vocational school. If they chose, students could, alternatively, continue their education at Narongrit Yal Rajbanrung school (formerly Yala Provincial School).

(U) There was, however, a shortage of teachers for the Tambons. In 1934, a training school for teachers of grades 1 and 2 was established in the elementary agricultural school. Students who had graduated from classes 5 and 6 of the elementary agricultural school could enter these teachers' training classes. Unfortunately, no one wanted to send his children to agricultural school. The elementary agricultural school was,

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therefore, transferred to the Muang Yala Municipality, and in 1939, the teachers' training program was discontinued. In 1940, the teachers' training program was reinstated in the form of a special secondary class. In 1943, its name was changed to "local teachers' training class," and a primary teacher training program and a program leading to a diploma of education, including a diploma of high education sciences were added to the curriculum. These degrees were equivalent to those granted at the Teachers' College, Yala Province.

(U) The next national administration allotted a larger budget for education. Consequently, local schools were improved. Again, there was a shortage of teachers, and the vocational school of carpentry was dissolved because of a shortage of student applicants. On October 11, 1958, a handicraft school for girls was established in the building that the carpentry school had formerly occupied. Later a new carpentry school was opened, and on May 17, 1967, the Vocational Education Department combined the handicraft school for girls and the carpentry school into the school of Engineering, Yala Province.

(U) Many problems developed that were related to religious and political matters. The local Muslims are extremely religious, peace-loving people. Ambitious leaders, however, were creating disorder. In 1947, a group led by Haji Sulong submitted demands to the government. Among other things, this group demanded that the schools teach in Malay and that Malay, as well as Thai, be recognized as an official language. The dissidents became impatient when their demands were not met. They turned to force. They burned schools in Pattani and Narathiwat Provinces. After the uprising was suppressed, the government did adopt some of the changes presented by this group.

(U) Several steps have been taken to improve the status of teachers. In 1958, the government raised the status of local school

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teachers to government officials, an act that increased the teachers' pride in their occupation. A project to improve elementary education was simultaneously put into effect. The new educational act called for compulsory elementary education regulations that were to be strictly enforced. In 1957, only 11 percent of the residents of Yala Province were literate, even though Yala Province was one of the first provinces in which compulsory education was instituted.

(U) The Muslims, however, still resented the fact that all teaching was done in the Thai language. They wanted their children to learn the Malay language and the Koran. Muslim parents preferred to send their children to teachers called "Toh Kru," who taught Islam in places called Poh Noh. Because of such opposition, in 1947 the government passed an act allowing the Malay language and the Islam religion to be taught. Four textbooks in the Malay language were provided, and, in 1950, an Islamic college was opened in the central region.

(U) In spite of these concessions, the Muslims continued to be more interested in studying in the Poh Noh, and the number of Poh Noh increased. Some Poh Noh were teaching students who were required by law to attend a school where the Thai language was taught. To relieve the situation, the Ministry of Education issued regulations for the improvement of the Poh Noh. Any Poh Noh that observed these regulations would be entitled to financial aid from His Majesty the King. This project received full cooperation from all the Poh Noh.

(U) The improvement of education in Yala Province showed tangible results. In 1958, the Ministry of Education started a project of regional education development. Government advisers for this project were local people, who collected precise data. The following are the results of this project:

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(1) (U) Classes for Small Children Were Opened in the Muslim Schools (U)

(U) These preschool classes prepared the children to begin learning the Thai language in grade one of the elementary school. Those children who had attended small children's classes learned the Thai language more easily than those who were admitted directly to grade one.

(2) (U) Border School Buildings Were Improved (U)

(U) Because sufficient schools had been made available in Thailand, children in Thai territory were no longer allowed to go to school in Malaysia.

(3) (U) The Quality of the Poh Noh Were Improved (U)

(U) Various Poh Noh were presented with curricula schedules, and books. Consequently, the quality of education received there was greatly improved. Many Poh Noh became registered private schools.

(4) (U) Islamic Schools Improved Their Courses (U)

(U) They added general subjects which made their curricula nearly the same as those of general private schools.

(5) (U) Government Educational Policies Were Reconciled with Thai-Muslim Customs and Traditions (U)

(U) The Education Ministry's regulations and orders that contradicted customs and traditions of the Thai-Muslims were changed. For example, Muslims were granted leaves of absence for pilgrimages to observe Haji Service in Mecca.

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(6) (U) Adult Education was Expanded and Improved (U)

(U) The King desired that the Muslims be able to speak Thai without recourse to interpreters. Adult education classes in the Thai language and classes in vocational science, taught in Thai, were opened.

(7) (U) Mobile Vocational Education Units Were Introduced (U)

(U) Mobile vocational education units which taught vocational science and periodically, as required by Toh Kru, religion in the Poh Noh.

(8) (U) Financial Aid Was Given to Students of Islam (U)

(U) Students of Islam who had done well in class 4 (elementary) and had graduated to form 5 of Triam U-dom school were given financial aid. These scholarships encouraged both parents and students to further their education.

(9) (U) New Methods of Teaching the Thai Language Were Introduced (U)

(U) Two experimental teaching methods were effective. The first was teaching during play activities. The second was based on improving the student's tone. In addition, Thai language lessons were made compatible with the customs and traditions of the local people and with the Islamic religion.

(10) (U) The Technological Capability of Schools at Every Level Was Improved (U)

(U) Appropriate training was required of teachers at every grade level. All teachers were taught improved methods of teaching.

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(11) (U) Curriculum Schedules and Timetables for Courses
Were Established (U)

(U) The schedules released by the Education Ministry had previously been used. However, these included lessons in geography, culture, and traditions that were not applicable in the area. The new schedules corrected these oversights.

b. (U) Mobile Vocational Trade Unit (MVTU) (U)

(U) On June 17, 1960, the Department of Vocational Education, Ministry of Education, established the first Mobile Vocational Trade Unit at Amphur Sawi, Chumphon Province. This unit provides short vocational courses to the people in the provincial areas who require advanced training, but have been unable to obtain it.

(U) The objectives of MVTU are to:

- Provide vocational education facilities for the people in the provincial areas. Classes in handicraft, light industry, and business were provided.
- Promote the government's program for economic development through vocational education of the rural population. The following are provided:
 - (1) Facilities and instructors in remote areas for vocational education of unskilled labor
 - (2) Additional training for those individuals working at a particular vocation for the purpose of increasing their skills and income level
 - (3) An opportunity to those who would like to change their occupations by receiving instruction in a different vocation
 - (4) Instruction to all who are interested in self-improvement. When the supply of students is exhausted, the MVTU moves to another amphur and/or province.

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(U) Three hundred hours (equal to about five months) of instruction is provided in each subject offered by the ANTU. The instructional time is divided into three periods as follows:

Morning period	0900 - 1200
Afternoon period	1300 - 1600
Evening period	1700 - 2000

(U) Each student must understand the Thai language and must have completed the minimum formal education level of Prathom 4. He must be at least 13 years old. To complete the course of instruction, the student must have attended a minimum of 225 hours or more of instruction and scored 60 percent or higher on the examination in theory and practice. Students completing the course are presented a qualification document by the Department of Vocational Education.

(U) The following specific vocational subjects were offered:

- Tailoring of men's clothing
- Dressmaking
- Brassiere making
- Embroidery (with sewing machine)
- Hairdressing
- Cooking
- Barbering
- Electric circuits and electric appliance repair
- Radio repair
- Sewing machine and typewriter repair
- Engine repair
- Construction of instructional aids
- Shoe repair
- Welding
- Construction (basic)
- Accounting

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Table 13 gives data on classes held at the MVTU for 1960 to 1967.

(U) The operation of the MVTU is hindered by the following:

- Communications in the remote areas covered by MVTU operations are quite poor
- The movement of the MVTU from one area to another is quite difficult due to a shortage of vehicles
- Living quarters for teachers and MVTU officers are difficult to obtain in the target areas
- The facilities provided for the MVTU schools are inadequate
- There is a shortage of equipment and teaching aids.

3. (U) Agriculture and Veterinary Services (U)

(U) Although the projects and activities of the provincial agricultural and veterinary organizations, which are a very important part of the overall Community Development Program, are not designed specifically for counterinsurgency, they do have an effect in weaning the population away from insurgent influences. The rural population is made aware of the government's activities, of its desire to aid and instruct them in animal husbandry and agricultural methods, and its ability to do so.

a. (U) Agriculture (U)

(U) The Provincial Agriculture Officers are held responsible, by the Ministry of Agriculture, for promoting advanced agricultural methods and techniques in the province of responsibility. Each month, they submit operational plans and each year, or on request, they submit summary reports to the Ministry of Agriculture.

(U) The following data were extracted from monthly reports of provincial offices:

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Table 13

U. S. STUDENT AND LIAISON RECORD OF
MOBILE VOCATIONAL TRADE UNIT FROM 1960 TO 1967

Academic Year	Location	No. of Students			No. of Groups
		Men	Women	Total	
1960	Amphur Sui, Changwat Chumphon	166	202	468	1
1961	Amphur Kra-buri, Changwat Ranong	70	106	176	1
1961	Amphur Langsuan, Changwat Chumphon	63	82	145	1
1961	Amphur Muang, Changwat Surat-Thani	248	443	691	2
1962	Amphur Muang, Changwat Surat-Thani	195	499	694	2
1962	Amphur Tunpin, Changwat Surat-Thani	62	208	270	2
1962	Tamb. Apradoo, Amphur Kok-Phoo, Pattani	683	680	1,363	2
1962	Muban Sate, Amphur Kok-Phoo, Pattani	132	113	247	1
1963	Amphur Sai-buri, Changwat Pattani	479	420	899	2
1963	Ban Pairo Internation, Amphur Mayo and Phanarac (Pattani)	260	497	757	2
1964	Amphur Ra-ngai, Narathiwat	541	593	1,136	2
1965	Amphur Sungai Ko-lok, Narathiwat	399	569	968	2
1965	Amphur Sungai Padi, Narathiwat	141	257	398	2
1966	Amphur Sungai Ko-lok, Narathiwat	96	318	414	2
1966	Amphur Sungai Padi, Narathiwat	194	143	337	2
1966	Amphur Waeng, Narathiwat	102	194	296	2
1967	Amphur Muang, Narathiwat	122	144	266	18
	Total	4,053	5,472	9,525	

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1. Technical Education and Demonstrations

(U) Agricultural exhibits are presented at the provincial and ampur fairs in the various ampurs. Advice is given to both individuals and groups concerning advances in agricultural techniques and methods. In addition, practice contests are organized. Equipment, fertilization techniques, and methods of controlling crop parasites are demonstrated.

2. 1. Training and Seminars (U)

(U) Seminars are conducted on a monthly basis for provincial and ampur agricultural officials. In addition, the rural people are trained in the following subjects:

- Growing and processing rubber, including techniques of replanting using high-yield trees and tapping
- Growing rice and other farm crops
- Cultivating fruit and coconut trees
- Cultivating, fertilizing, and irrigating crops in general
- Controlling parasites.

3. U Distribution of Materials (U)

(U) Agricultural materials distributed include seeds and seedlings, insecticides, fertilizers, and construction materials. Tools for tilling the soil, eradicating parasites, and fertilizing were also distributed, but most were on a loan basis only.

4. U Research (U)

(U) The provincial agricultural officers are held responsible for conducting research on special crops. They test the crop's

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compatibility with the environment and the ability of the rural population to plant, cultivate, and harvest the crop. Studies on the market demand and the economic impact of a particular crop on the local area are conducted.

b. Veterinary Services

The mission of the provincial veterinary surgeon is to prevent or detect, diagnose, and eradicate animal diseases. In addition, the veterinary surgeon is held responsible for the welfare of all animals in his area of jurisdiction and for the development of improved breeds and improved feed.

c. Self Help and Land Resettlement Projects

There are several Self Help and Land Resettlement Projects being conducted in the border provinces. The first of these projects began operation in 1959, and the most recent was started in 1964 (see Figure 23). Thai officials usually refer to these projects as colonies.

The original, and still the main, purpose for the establishment of the projects in the border provinces was to distribute government-owned land to selected, according to need and other criteria, Thai families and then to assist them in developing this land. A second objective was apparently decided on somewhat later. It is to attract primarily Buddhist settlers to these colonies so that the number of Buddhist residents in the region will be more nearly equal to the number of Islamic residents. Accordingly, those colonies that were established early, such as that at Dok Plo and at Nihon Rang in Sarathitai, have a high proportion of Thai-Islam settlers. In contrast, there are very few Thai-Islam settlers in colonies established later, such as the Southern Land Development Settlements in Yala.

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


FIGURE 23 LOCATION OF MAJOR SELF HELP AND LAND RESETTLEMENT PROJECTS IN FIVE BORDER PROVINCES (U)

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1. These colonies are operated by the Department of Public Works, Ministry of the Interior. There are variations in the way the individual colonies are governed, but there is a general pattern. The government first sets aside a tract of land for resettlement, then assigns personnel to develop and operate the colony. These government appointees usually include a governor, a technical engineer, at least until major construction projects are completed, a sanitation officer, one or two agricultural experts, clerical staff, mechanics, drivers, and laborers. The colony builds a road from the major immediate highway to wherever the main headquarters of the colony are to be located. Also it constructs a "center" of operations, including an office, various maintenance buildings, housing for personnel, and one or two other kinds of buildings. In some of the centers there is electricity and a water tank, but these facilities serve only the needs of the colony employees who live and work at the center. In addition, the colony builds one or more four-year primary schools, which are staffed by teachers provided by the Ministry of Education. The next stage is to divide the land in the colony into plots for the settlers. Each head of a family received, in the first phase of the resettlement program, approximately 12.5 acres in the early colonies, but this amount was reduced to 9.5 acres in the colonies established later. Access roads are built to these plots, and an area of three acres is cleared at the front near the access road of each plot so that it is ready for the settler to build his home on.

2. After these steps have been taken potential settlers are encouraged to apply. They are screened, and then they are notified as to whom has been accepted. Those accepted immediately begin preparations to liquidate any personal property that they cannot carry with them. Usually the male head of the family comes to the colony first, since there is no immediate housing available for his family. He lives in a dormitory while building his house. He receives either food or a small

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living allowance from the colony and is not charged for his stay in the dormitory. He also receives a loan of amount equivalent to US\$500 with which to build his house and support his family until his first cash crop is ready for the market.

U The settler is required to grow a cash crop on the three-fourths of an acre around his house that the colony has already cleared. This crop, and successive crops grown on this small plot, must support his family until he clears the rest of his land. Each settler and his family plant their own cash crops and clear the rest of the land themselves. The government will loan the settler another loan to help in the clearing of his land. This money is sometimes used to rent a tractor or bulldozer and operator from the colony. More often, however, it is used to support the family while it clears the land by hand.

L In the early colonies, there was no restriction on the type of crops that the settler could grow. However, in more recently established colonies, there are regulations concerning the nature of the crops. For example, in the Southern Land Development Settlement, the settler is required to plant approximately one-half of his land in rubber trees, one-fourth in coconut trees, and one-fourth in fruit trees. The agricultural officers assigned to the colony advise the settlers about seeds, fertilizer, the planting process, and the harvesting of his crops.

U Other colony services are also available to the settler. Free transportation from his plot to the local market where he can sell his produce and buy food and supplies is provided at least once a week. Also the colony will purchase and store seed and food, which the settler can purchase at cost. Some colonies even build places for religious worship to be used by the settlers.

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It is generally felt that these farmers probably have more
sense of self-reliance than for a better way of life than they have
previously had. However, an increasing number of these settlers now find
outside the border provinces, and therefore most of the local people are
not benefiting directly from this program. Also, in other colonies, it
is felt that the settlers, having not been eligible for government
loans, have often been obliged to borrow money from moneylenders at high
interest rates. There have been instances where the settlers in some
colonies have not received the full value of their expected loans and
they now have been forced to seek other sources of relief. In such cases,
the colonies are being forced to give the settlers part, or even all, of what
of the law that is being observed and obeyed by some of the settlers.
rights are somewhat better. They claim that earlier district officials
said that their title would be legalized at some point in the future.
Of course, in many cases they subsequently rescinded the district
officials. Nevertheless, they tend to be unhappy about the consequences
of the present program. Another difficulty is that Thai-Lao living
in the already heavily populated border areas of the border provinces
feel a bit resentful of the fact that recently they have not been
encouraged to settle in the colonies. This resentment is turned partly
against Thai-landed settlers and partly against the government. In
light of this latter phenomenon, therefore, there is some question as to
whether the colonies, given their present orientation, might not hinder
the government's attempt to bring about closer rapport with the Thai-Lao.

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V. THE UNITED STATES ORGANIZATION AND PROGRAM

(1) This report will not include all the data on organizations and programs included in the KMIX-1 version of the manual for northeast Thailand, but will consider only those items pertinent to the programs being conducted in South Thailand by U.S. organizations.

- 1. U.S. Operations Mission (UOM)
- 2. U.S. Information Service (UIS)
- 3. U.S. Military Group
- 4. U.S. Army Medical Forces
Force Corps

(2) Except for special programs, most of the above named organizations will be discussed in the context of the U.S. organizations they advise or assist.

A. United States Operations Mission (UOM)

(1) The mission and organization of UOM for Thailand is contained in the KMIX-1 version of the counterinsurgency operations and programs in northeast Thailand.

(2) This manual only considers the UOM officials who are currently operating in the five new born provinces.

1. (1) Public Safety (1)

(1) There are presently ten Public Safety advisors located in Bangkok. One is responsible for advising the Provincial Police, the other advises the LPP and the Special Branch of the Police Department.

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1. The advisor to the Provincial Police with its headquarters at the Headquarters, 5th Region Provincial Police, and at the contingent level within the region. In general terms, the advisor is expected to maintain surveillance over all LORC furnished equipment and funds, review and requests for aid from the regional commander and recommend changes or further requirements. As is the case of all advisors, the Public Safety Advisor has no control over the usage or disposition of materiel resources, but must present his advice to the regional commander. It is such a way as to convince the commander it would be to his advantage to operate in the manner suggested.

2. The advisor to the IPP and the Third Police Department's Special Branch is located in Bengalia. He is responsible for maintaining surveillance on the usage and condition of all LORC furnished equipment and funds. Further, in cooperation with the commander, 9th Area IPP he makes recommendations concerning further aid and the need for specialized equipment or training. His position with respect to the Special Branch is analogous to his position with the IPP.

3. In addition, the advisor is responsible for maintaining records and reporting on the general situation in his area of responsibility that concern the insurgent and counterinsurgent forces.

Public Health

1. One U.S. Public Health Officer assigned as an advisor to the Military Public Health Development Center at Bengalia. The advisor's duties include evaluating the kind of aid provided and recommending additional kinds of aid, either monetary or in the form of medical supplies.

2. One U.S. Public Health Officer is assigned, through USAID, to the Region II Malaria Prediction Center at Bengalia. This advisor is

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responsible for maintaining surveillance of AID funds and supplies to the regional centers. In addition, the advisor gives personal attention to the operations in the region and recommends changes and specialized training or both as required.

1. There is a USOM advisor at the Public Health Training Center in Yala. The principal duty of this advisor is to cooperate with the center faculty in reviewing the curriculum for training health workers.

2. Community Development (U)

1. There is a USOM advisor at the Community Development Training Center located at Yala. This advisor must maintain close liaison with all community development officers in South Thailand for the purpose of keeping aware of the training required of the community development trainees at the center. This advisor may then suggest curriculum changes or additions to the center faculty.

B. (U) United States Information Service (ISIS) (U)

1. The mission and organization of ISIS in Thailand is contained in the EACDPT document on the "Counterinsurgency Operations and Programs in Southeast Thailand." This report considers only those ISIS officials who are currently active in the five southern provinces.

(U) There are two BPAOs (Branch Public Affairs Offices) in the five southern provinces, with one branch post officer assigned to each BPAO. The BPAO located in Yala, Amphur Muang, Yala Province, has an area of responsibility that includes Yala, Pattani, and Narathivan Provinces. The BPAO located in Songkhla, Amphur Muang, Songkhla Province, has an area of responsibility that includes Songkhla and Satul Provinces.

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(U) The programs conducted by these two BPAOs conform to the field programs as described by the RACFO-T version of the "Counterinsurgency Organizations and Programs in Northeast Thailand." It should be noted, however, that neither of these BPAOs has a library facility.

(U) The following are several of the problems facing the branch post officers at each of the BPAOs:

1. The majority of the population in the south are Thai-Muslim. The provinces of Yala, Pattani, Narathivas, and Satul are often referred to as the "Moslem Provinces." Except for Satul, where Thai is spoken, Malay is the language generally spoken. The BPAO in Yala is thus faced with the problem of having Thai language films, booklets, leaflets, etc., that the majority of the people cannot (or will not) understand or read.
2. The Communist menace in the five southern provinces is not the same as the Communist threat in the rest of Thailand. The majority of the CTs in the south are ethnically Chinese and are being led by former Malaysian CTs.
3. The falling price of rubber and tin, the two main outputs of the south, has resulted in a very serious economic slump in the five southern provinces.

c. (U) MACTHAI JUSMAG (U)

(U) The RACFO-T "Counterinsurgency Organizations and Programs in Northeast Thailand" describes the organization and mission of MACTHAI JUSMAG.

(U) At the present time there is only one U.S. Army Officer assigned to advise the Thai military in the five southern provinces. The advisor to the 5th Regimental Combat Team Commander is located at the headquarters of the 5th RCT, Koh Hong Camp, Songkhla Province.

(U) An additional advisor is normally assigned to the Battalion Combat Team at Camp Colonel Ingkayudhborcham, Pattani Province.

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D. (U) U.S. Army Special Forces (U)

(U) The RACFO-T "Counterinsurgency Organizations and Programs in Northeast Thailand" describes the organization and mission of the U.S. Army Special Forces in Thailand.

(U) At present, one A Team is stationed at Kluang Ngae in Songkhla Province. This team is responsible for training BPP in counterinsurgency activities. This training is sponsored by USOM and is under the direction of the BPP Advisor in Songkhla. The parent organization of the A Team is the B Team in Trang Province.

E. (U) Peace Corps (U)

(U) The basic organization and the missions of the Peace Corps in Thailand are described in the RACFO-T "Counterinsurgency Organizations and Programs in Northeast Thailand."

(U) A Peace Corps regional office is located in Songkhla, Songkhla Province. This regional office is responsible for Peace Corps activities and personnel in eleven southern provinces.

(U) The basic purpose of the Peace Corps in southern Thailand is to help those Thais with whom Peace Corps Volunteers (PCVs) come into direct or indirect contact. At the request of the Royal Thai Government, PCVs have worked with already established and functioning governmental agencies. In support of the government's stated attack on poverty, illiteracy, and disease, PCVs have been assigned to positions under the direction of the departments of Education, Malaria Eradication, Community Development, and Health.

(U) The types of projects undertaken by PCVs are extremely varied. Some PCVs are working in the teachers' training colleges and secondary schools, and some are working as advisors and supervisors at the elementary

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level. Malaria Eradication PCVs are working chiefly as counterparts to assistant Zone Chiefs; they supervise and survey the effectiveness of the various spray teams.

(U) Community Development Volunteers have been working out of both the provincial offices and the regional centers. They advise villagers and work with them on projects in construction, agriculture, and women's groups. Village Health and Sanitation Volunteers have been working out of the provincial and regional health offices on village water system and privy construction. The Physical Education Volunteers have been working out of the regional education centers, concentrating chiefly on upgrading physical education programs at the elementary school level. Data on Peace Corps activities are given in Table 14.

Table 14

(U) ACTIVITIES OF PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS
IN THE FIVE SOUTHERN PROVINCES (U)

Function	Province					Total
	Songkhla	Satun	Yala	Pattani	Narathivat	
Teaching English as a Foreign Language	5		4	4	5	18
Physical Education	1		2			3
Community Development		1	7	3	2	13
Malaria Eradication			1			1
Village Health and Sanitation	<u>2</u>	-	-	-	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>
Total PCVs	8	1	14	7	9	39

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VI (U) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SUPPORT FROM OTHER COUNTRIES (U)

(U) This section will briefly discuss programs sponsored by the United Nations in south Thailand. Such programs are not considered by their sponsor as being specifically related to counterinsurgency, but they do have a direct bearing on long range country development.

(U) Organizations to be considered are:

1. World Health Organization (WHO)
2. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

A. (U) World Health Organization (U)

(U) WHO has a representative stationed in Songkhla Town, Songkhla Province. This representative is working closely with the Malaria Eradication Program.

B. (U) Food and Agriculture Organization (U)

(U) In cooperation with the Royal Thai Government, FAO maintains a Rubber Research Centre in Koh Hong, Haadyai, Songkhla Province. A number of foreign experts are now in residence at the center. They give training and act as advisers on agricultural matters. The purpose of this center is to experiment with improved varieties of rubber trees and improved methods of tapping and processing the rubber. Thai staff are trained to manage the center. Eventually, they are expected to take over from the foreign experts. Also, rubber holders, tappers, and processors are trained in new methods developed at the center.

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COUNTERINSURGENCY ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS: SOUTH THAILAND (U)

Research Memorandum

Robert E. Morse

March 1969

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This report is releasable to authorized agencies of the Royal Thai Government on the basis that it is a report of a project jointly carried out under the direction and with the approval of the Joint Thai-U.S. Military Research and Development Center.

Advanced Research Projects Agency
Office of the Secretary of Defense

This report contains information pertaining to insurgency and counterinsurgency in the five most southern provinces of Thailand. The insurgent activity is considered in relation to both actual and potential sources of conflict. The counterinsurgency effort--direct security measures, and both short- and long-term development projects--is also discussed. (U)

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<p>Insurgency Counterinsurgency Civic action Community development South Thailand Communist terrorist organization</p>						

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